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Regulation of Physician Conflicts of
Interest and Standards of Care
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This Article critically examines calls by scholars, legislators, and regulators advocating
the imposition of fiduciary duties upon a broad range of actors including judges, jurors,
agencies, parents, friends, and even entire countries. The Article examines the
physician-patient relationship—an archetypal and frequently cited relationship in which
fiduciary duties, administered by courts, are asserted to work well. It argues that some of the
most significant problems fiduciary duties are used to address like asymmetry of information,
conflicts of interest, and professional conduct have not only been handled badly by courts, but
have actually found more effective resolution through legislative fact-finding, acknowledgment
of the complexity of medical practice, and ultimately regulatory solutions aimed at sources of
conflicts of interest and specific circumstances in which claims for medical malpractice arise.
Behind many of these initiatives are physicians themselves—who experience the sources of
potential conflicts and endeavor to create self-regulatory and legislative solutions to them. In
contrast, court-administered fiduciary duties are often marginalized as judicially manageable
claims related to the duties of loyalty and the duty of care converge, litigants focus on settlement,
and the high expectations held for fiduciaries are rarely enforced. The Article concludes that
not only may imposing more fiduciary duties on more relationships not generate the benefits
many scholars suggest, but that doing so will stymie more targeted and effective solutions to
problems that occur in trust relationships.
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INTRODUCTION
Legal scholars, legislators, and regulators have in recent years undertaken an
expansive effort to make agencies, judges, jurors, Medicare billers, friends, and even
entire countries into fiduciaries to one or more constituencies, replete with duties
of care, deliberation, good faith, and loyalty enforceable by judicial means.1

1. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3–21(j) (2017) (requiring retirement plan advisors be fiduciaries);
Isaac D. Buck, Furthering the Fiduciary Metaphor: The Duty of Providers to the Payers of Medicare, 104
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Traditionally reserved for relationships in the nominally private sphere that
nevertheless impacted public or quasi-public interests—e.g., attorneys and clients,
directors and shareholders, guardians and wards—purported fiduciary duties now
abound. This effort to stretch the fiduciary analogy promises more robust virtue,
exercised by more of society’s actors, for the benefit of those locked out or
marginalized by prevailing economic and political structures.
These fiduciary duties, it is theorized, will make decision-makers more
conscientious of stakeholders who trust them to act justly, add a stratum of judicially
imposed oversight to ensure that those decision-makers do so, and promote
transparency through the responsibility of fiduciaries to articulate reasons for their
action or inaction, justify those reasons, and keep adequate records so that
justifications may be subject to judicial or public scrutiny.2 These benefits will flow
from the structure of the fiduciary relationship, especially its empowerment of the
quintessentially informed, deliberative, beneficent fiduciary empowered by law to
decide what is right. Fiduciaries’ discretion—the flexibility to decide—is inherently
virtuous, as it is exercised with “superior information, experience, or expertise,” and
done so for the welfare of their beneficiaries.3
To be sure, scholarly inquiry encourages areas of law to be studied and then
loaned or applied elsewhere, often beneficially so. Comparative constitutional law
has played a substantial role in promoting the expansion of due process and
right-to-life norms into constitutional frameworks drawn from heterogeneous
traditions.4 Judges in common law countries routinely apply concepts developed in
contract, employment, and corporate law to questions involving wills and trusts,
divorce, and negligence.5 The notion of “duty” plays a prominent role in many of
these contexts, as it does in the current movement encouraging the expansion of
fiduciary duties outside their conventional private law domains.6
Yet it is argued here that the expansion of the fiduciary metaphor has exceeded
the limit of its beneficial application. It has become utopian—in the satirical sense

CALIF. L. REV. 1043 (2016) (discussing how medical providers who bill Medicare are now
fiduciaries); Ethan J. Leib & Stephen R. Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory: A Critique, 125
YALE L.J. 1820 (2016) (covering literature on public authorities theorized to be subject to fiduciary
constraints including judges, regulators, and states in the international system); Ethan J. Leib, Friends
as Fiduciaries, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 665 (2009) (friends); Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary
Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation in Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV. 441 (2010);
Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 331 (2009).
2. Criddle, supra note 1, at 469.
3. Id. at 471.
4. Sam F. Halabi, Constitutional Borrowing as Jurisprudential and Political Doctrine in Shri
D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, 3 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 73 (2013); see also David
Schleicher, City Unplanning, 122 YALE L.J. 1670 (2013).
5. See, e.g., Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463 (2002); Donald
C. Langevoort, Half-Truths: Protecting Mistaken Inferences by Investors and Others, 52 STAN. L. REV. 87
(1999); Robert J. Rhee, The Tort Foundation of Duty of Care and Business Judgment, 88 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1139 (2013).
6. Rhee, supra note 5.
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intended by Sir Thomas More—a place literally too good to be true.7 Like Plato’s
Republic, the world of fiduciaries empowers a multitude of benign oligarchs,
“philosopher-kings,” whose contemplative, beneficent, and transparent decisions
will salvage the world torn asunder by ugly partisan lawmaking, opportunistic
contracting behavior, and decreasing judicial oversight of shrinking legal duties
between citizens.
If the policies and reforms advocated by fiduciary utopians rendered benign
or unimportant inefficiencies, it might not be worth an article-length contribution.
But the criticism presented herein goes beyond those leveled by scholars like Seth
Davis, who doubts that fiduciary norms may be applied in contexts where there is
not a “discrete class of beneficiaries,” or Ethan Leib and Stephen Galoob, who
argue that applications of fiduciary theory to public authorities is conceptually
ambiguous and undisciplined.8
Rather, this Article argues that the application of fiduciary duties to more legal
relationships distracts from lawmaking and law-enforcement processes that lead to
more effective solutions to the problems that fiduciary duties are asserted to solve.
For example, imposing a broad “duty of loyalty” on a class of political authorities
undermines the fact-gathering and policy process that leads to targeted solutions
where concrete, identifiable problems emerge. The “loyalty” of corporate directors
is not under threat by ambiguous, poorly understood sources that require broad
duties. It is under threat by the temptation to use corporate assets for personal gain
or to exploit opportunities that rightfully belong to the corporation.9 Although
ERISA-covered employers are fiduciaries with respect to the decisions they make
when implementing health and benefit plans for their employees, the actual
requirements for their conduct are determined largely through statute and
notice-and-comment rulemaking.10

7. THOMAS MORE, UTOPIA (George M. Logan, Robert M. Adams & Clarence H. Miller
eds., 2006).
8. Seth Davis, The False Promise of Fiduciary Government, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1145, 1158
(2014); Leib & Galoob, supra note 1, at 1846; see also Mark Osiel, Rights to Do Grave Wrong, 5 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 107, 165–67 (2013) (analyzing the distinction between metaphorical and legal invocations of
the fiduciary, especially by Jeremy Waldron); Sean P. Sullivan, Powers, But How Much Power? Game
Theory and the Nondelegation Principle, 104 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1254–55 (2018) (analyzing Congress’s
delegation of authority to agencies as representative of the fiduciary relationship between principal
and agent).
9. Despite well-developed Delaware case law on director conflicts of interest, most states,
including Delaware, adopt a statutory approach to managing them. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 144 (2017); CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(a) (West 2020); Gregory H. Shill, The Golden Leash and
the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1246, 1256–59, 1261–64 (2017). As Robert Anderson
and Derek Muller have argued in the attorney context, gatekeeping the profession itself is a legitimate
alternative for ensuring the behavior of fiduciaries. Robert Anderson IV & Derek T. Muller, The High
Cost of Lowering the Bar, 32 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 307 (2019).
10. EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., MEETING YOUR FIDUCIARY
RESPONSIBILITIES (2017), https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/
resource-center/publications/meeting-your-fiduciary-responsibilities.pdf [ https://perma.cc/LW6S-
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The evidence in support of this argument is one of the storied fiduciary
relationships in law—the doctor-patient relationship. Determined from the time of
ancient Athens to be fiduciaries with respect to those they heal, physicians are
required by law to use their specialized skills for the benefit of patients without
regard to personal gain; to do so according to the degree of skill and care that would
ordinarily be exercised by a physician in similar circumstances; to keep records that
justify the treatment decisions they order; and to maintain the confidences and
sensitive information with which they are entrusted. Indeed, physicians are among
the most admired and respected professions for precisely these reasons.11
But physicians’ adherence to these principles of fiduciary behavior have not
resulted from broadly drawn duties of loyalty, care, and confidence enforced by
similarly sage judges in federal and state courts. Rather, they have resulted from
specific, targeted laws and regulations—the development of which physicians
themselves as well as patients have participated and shaped. Transparency in the
conduct of medical treatment has resulted from “disclosure” and “sunshine” laws
aimed not at physicians, but at those who would tempt them with costly drugs and
therapies that may not benefit their patients.12 Patient confidence has been secured
by state and federal laws that understand that just because physicians are expertly
trained and care about their patients does not mean that they know all the ways that
privacy may be breached.13
In short, rather than the learned, discretion-wielding heroes suggested by
much of the recent literature on fiduciaries, the behavior of physicians toward their
patients has been shaped by legislators, regulators, and physicians themselves who
understand that notwithstanding their extensive training, physicians care for
patients in a complex world of finance, health, illness, and treatment that
conventional lawmaking processes can and should address.14 The ambitious

TARY ]; Ann Laquer Estin, Sharing Governance: Family Law in Congress and the States, 18 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 267, 321–23 (2009) (summarizing ERISA’s reach).
11. Niall McCarthy, America’s Most and Least Trusted Professions, FORBES (Jan. 4, 2018, 7:54
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2018/01/04/americas-most-and-least-trustedprofessions-infographic/#38b8e1df65b5 [ https://perma.cc/7HSY-5L5S ]; Dayna Bowen Matthew,
Implementing American Health Care Reform: The Fiduciary Imperative, 59 BUFF. L. Rᴇᴠ. 715, 730 (2011)
(“Physicians in Ancient Greece organized themselves into a professional guild, in which members
shared professional principles most famously articulated sometime during the fourth century B.C. by
the Greek medical philosopher Hippocrates. Hippocrates wrote the oath which required new physicians
to swear upon Apollo and a number of healing gods to uphold the ethical principles of their
profession: ‘I will follow that system of regimen which, according to my ability and judgment, I consider
for the benefit of my patients, and abstain from whatever is deleterious and mischievous.’”
(footnote omitted)).
12. See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6002, 124
Stat. 119, 689 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7h); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 24173(c) (West 2006).
13. Julie K. Taitsman, Christi Macrina Grimm & Shantanu Agrawal, Protecting Patient Privacy
and Data Security, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 977 (2013).
14. SHARON P. DOUGLAS, AM. MED. ASS’N, CEJA REP. NO. 1-A-12, REPORTS OF THE
COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS 2 (2012), https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/ama-
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application of more fiduciary duties to more actors in society falsely promises a
greater level of “trust” by those actors than even conventional fiduciaries have ever
been able to deliver.
Moreover, at least in those contexts in which courts are understood to better
police fiduciary principles, there are good reasons to doubt that they will be better
positioned to enforce fiduciary principles applied to more relationships. The passive
recipients of competitively generated evidence and information, litigation is a poor
substitute for the fact-finding and community engagement undertaken in legislative
and administrative processes. For both substantive and process reasons,
court-administered duties are not likely to generate better social outcomes. To be
sure, judicially identified fiduciary duties may be codified by legislatures which may
in turn inform later iterations of rules and standards for fiduciaries’ conduct,
discretion, and good faith. But doing so frequently depends on a sufficiently
aggrieved beneficiary to adequately complain. Given the context in which breaches
of fiduciary duty arise, there are good reasons to doubt that level of grievance will
be sufficiently frequent, robust, or optimal.
Part I of this Article assesses the existing literature addressing fiduciary duties
and promoting their proliferation. Part II explains the history and structure of
fiduciary relationships generally and the physician-patient relationship specifically.
Part III surveys state and federal laws addressing the physician-patient relationship.
Part IV analyzes the policy gains achieved through application of fiduciary duties
and through legislative or regulatory approaches. Part V provides a brief conclusion.
I. THE ORIGIN, STRUCTURE, AND EXPANSION OF FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIPS
A. The Role of Fiduciary Relationships in Law
Fiduciary relationships are favored under law when they promote a special
trust between parties that benefits society generally. In those relationships, one
party (the entrustor) is dependent upon another party (the fiduciary) for some
service that “public policy encourages.”15 Fiduciary duties are “imposed when
public policy encourages specialization in particular services . . . and when the
entrustors’ costs of specifying and monitoring the fiduciaries’ functions threaten to

assn.org/files/corp/media-browser/public/about-ama/councils/Council%20Reports/council-onethics-and-judicial-affairs/ceja-1a12.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/P7T5-RYLJ ]
(“Arguments
that
physicians should never allow considerations other than the welfare of the patient before them to
influence their professional recommendations and treatment do not mesh with the reality of clinical
practice. Physicians regularly work with a variety of limits on care: clinical practice guidelines, patient
preferences, availability of certain services, the benefits covered by a patient’s insurance plan, and the
time physicians and nurses can spend caring for a patient all influence what interventions physicians
recommend and what care they provide.”).
15. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS
AND THE LAW 127, 127 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); see also Thomas P. Gallanis, The Contribution
of Fiduciary Law, in THE WORLDS OF THE TRUST 388, 390–94 (Lionel Smith ed., 2013).
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undermine the utility of the relationship to entrustors.”16 In other words, fiduciaries
are at their most desirable when entrustors lack the time, resources, or capability to
(1) do what fiduciaries can do and/or (2) effectively monitor them when they’re
doing it.17 The duty is supposed to give entrustors “incentives to enter into fiduciary
relationships,” which is done by “reducing entrustors’ risks and costs of preventing
abuse of entrusted power, and of ensuring quality fiduciary services.”18 In return
for the cost to fiduciaries for carrying out their duties, the law “increases their
marketability by endowing them with a reputation for honesty backed by
reputation.”19 However, the main purpose of the relationship is not to “satisfy both
parties’ needs, but only those of the entrustor.”20
Fiduciary duties are comprise of broadly applicable standards which courts
then complete with more specific rules. According to Robert Sitkoff,
[i]n all fiduciary relationships we find general duties of loyalty and care,
typically phrased as standards, which proscribe conflicts of interest and
prescribe an objective standard of care. But we also find specific subsidiary
fiduciary duties, often phrased as rules, that elaborate on the application of
the duties of loyalty and care to commonly recurring circumstances in the
particular form of fiduciary relationship.21
The duty of loyalty is the “core” fiduciary duty, the obligation to act toward
the entrustor or beneficiary without regard to one’s personal interest, to act
unselfishly.22 Because fiduciary relationships “trade upon high levels of trust and
leave one party in a position of domination, inferiority, or vulnerability,” the
“fiduciary is prohibited from engaging in self-interested transactions” and pursues
the interests of her beneficiary above her own.23 The fiduciary must be undivided
and undiluted in this fidelity. “The duty of loyalty proscribes misappropriation and
regulates conflicts of interest by requiring a fiduciary to act in the ‘best’ or even
‘sole’ interests of the [beneficiary].”24

16.
17.

Frankel, supra note 15, at 128.
See Reid Peyton Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians,
27 STAN. L. REV. 1213 (1975); Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource
Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970); Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading,
Congressional Officials, and Duties of Entrustment, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1105 (2011); Michael A. Perino, A
Scandalous Perversion of Trust: Modern Lessons from the Early History of Congressional Insider Trading,
67 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 335 (2015); E. Mabry Rogers & Stephen B. Young, Public Office as a Public
Trust: A Suggestion that Impeachment for High Crimes and Misdemeanors Implies a Fiduciary Standard,
63 GEO. L.J. 1025 (1975).
18. Frankel, supra note 15, at 128.
19. Id.
20. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 801 (1983).
21. Robert H. Sitkoff, An Economic Theory of Fiduciary Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 197, 198 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014); see also
Hall, supra note 5, at 491 (“Instead, general principles of fiduciary obligation give rise to various sets of
rules in many different settings in which the rules share only broad, familial resemblance.”).
22. Fiduciary Duty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 625 (6th ed. 1990).
23. Leib, supra note 1, at 672–74.
24. Sitkoff, supra note 21, at 201.
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Practically speaking, the duty of loyalty “requires fiduciaries to . . . avoid
conflicts of interest, secret profits, and misappropriating benefits that should accrue
to the beneficiary.”25 This highest duty applies to a wide range of private law
relationships: attorney-client, corporate director-shareholders, trustee-beneficiary,
agent-principal, guardian-ward, and physician-patient.26
The second duty that is commonly included as part of a fiduciary relationship
is the duty of care.27 This duty is similar to the duty of loyalty in that it requires the
fiduciary to act in an unselfish manner, yet, “unlike the duty of loyalty, the party
alleging a breach must be able to show that an injury resulted from the fiduciary’s
failure to meet the standard of care.”28 The fiduciary duty of care can range widely
in content, dependent as it is on the conduct of what courts expect of similarly
situated fiduciaries and the factual specificity of decisions they make.29
The third duty is that of utmost candor and disclosure.30 This duty requires
fiduciaries to reveal the reasons supporting the actions they take with respect to
beneficiaries and, when tied to the duty of loyalty, may further require fiduciaries
to disclose influences or interests that may affect the objectivity of their advice or
actions.31 Physicians, for example, must disclose the risks of the therapies they
advise to their patients; corporate directors must “provide stockholders with
accurate and complete information material to a transaction or other corporate
event that is being presented to them for action.”32
In many fiduciary relationships, like attorney-client and physician-patient,
beneficiaries are also protected by a duty of confidentiality.33 The fiduciary has the
duty not to misappropriate the information for the fiduciary’s own use (the duty of

25. Leib, supra note 1, at 674.
26. John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best Interest?,
114 YALE L.J. 929 (2005).
27. Leib, supra note 1, at 674.
28. Id.
29. See Roy Ryden Anderson & Walter W. Steele, Jr., Fiduciary Duty, Tort and Contract: A
Primer on the Legal Malpractice Puzzle, 47 SMU L. REV. 235 (1994); William A. Gregory, The Fiduciary
Duty of Care: A Perversion of Words, 38 AKRON L. REV. 181, 182 (2005) (“It has become commonplace
for courts and commentators to refer to the ‘fiduciary duty of care.’ The three most egregious examples
of this confusing rhetoric are the Delaware corporate law cases, the Uniform Partnership Act (1997),
and the legal malpractice cases that consider the concept of ‘fiduciary breach’ by an attorney.”
(footnotes omitted)).
30. John F. Mariani, Christopher W. Kammerer & Nancy Guffey-Landers, Understanding
Fiduciary Duty, 84 FLA. BAR J. 21 (2010).
31. Green v. H&R Block, Inc., 735 A.2d 1039, 1056 (Md. 1999) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 389 (AM. L. INST. 1958) as authority for an agent’s obligation to her principal
to disclose any information the principal would reasonably want to know).
32. Donald C. Langevoort, Agency Law Inside the Corporation: Problems of Candor and
Knowledge, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1187, 1198 (2003) (quoting Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998)).
33. See Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 237 F. Supp. 96, 102 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (finding
that the physician-patient relation is fiduciary); Lockett v. Goodill, 430 P.2d 589, 591
(Wash. 1967); MacDonald v. Clinger, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801, 805 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
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loyalty) but also a separate duty to keep the information itself confidential.34 An
attorney, for example, may not use information learned in the course of a
representation adversely to the client’s interest and also may not communicate
confidential information to others.35 Generally, a fiduciary may disclose protected
information “only in accordance with certain procedural and substantive safeguards,
chief among them full and fair disclosure by the fiduciary.”36
Fiduciaries are ultimately bound to their entrustors by a duty of good faith, a
duty that contracts or expands depending on the context in which it is applied.37
Against corporate directors, for example, the duty is synonymous with that of
loyalty.38 The fiduciary relationship between doctors and patients by contrast “arises
from the trust and confidence patients place in physicians.”39 Leib asserts the duty
of good faith is controversial either because “many have a hard time distinguishing
a fiduciary’s duty of good faith from a general duty of good faith that pervades all
performance of contractual duties,” or because “many feel that the duty of good
faith is simply a way of expressing duties imposed by other obligations, like the duty
of disclosure, the duty of loyalty, or the duty of care.”40
B. The Expansion of Fiduciary Relationships
So described, it is unsurprising that legislators, regulators, and legal scholars
have advocated that fiduciary relationships apply to more actors in the legal system.
Why wouldn’t we want more loyal, competent, discreet, and faithful legal, market,
and social actors? As Leib argues, the concept of a fiduciary relationship “is
self-consciously open, flexible, and adaptable to new kinds of relationships.”41 So
why not do so?42

34. See SUSAN R. MARTYN, BACK TO THE FUTURE: FIDUCIARY DUTY THEN AND NOW
12–13, 21 (Lawrence J. Fox, Susan R. Martyn & Andrew S. Pollis eds., 2009),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2056401
[ https://web.archive.org/web/
20200326210936/https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2056401 ].
35. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020); see also Murfreesboro
Med. Clinic v. Udom, 166 S.W.3d 674, 683 (Tenn. 2005) (“In analyzing this issue, we see no practical
difference between the practice of law and the practice of medicine. . . . These relationships are
‘consensual, highly fiduciary and peculiarly depend[ent] on the patient’s or client’s trust and confidence
in the physician consulted or attorney retained.’” (quoting Karlin v. Weinberg, 390 A.2d 1161, 1171
(1978))), superseded by statute, TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-1-148 (2016).
36. Sitkoff, supra note 21, at 201.
37. Gager v. Mathewson, 107 A. 1, 2–3 (Conn. 1919); see also Robert T. Miller, Lyondell
Chemical Co. v. Ryan: The Duty of Good Faith Comes to Revlon-Land, 11 ENGAGE 14, 14 (2010)
(analyzing the good faith component of the board’s duty of loyalty in the corporate context).
38. Am. Fed. Grp., Ltd. v. Rothenberg, 136 F.3d 897, 906 (2d Cir. 1998).
39. Matthew, supra note 11, at 726.
40. Leib, supra note 1, at 676.
41. Id. at 672.
42. See McKnatt v. McKnatt, 93 A. 367, 370 (Del. Ch. 1915) (“There is no fixed test to establish
a fiduciary relationship. It cannot be defined. It embraces the relation of physician and patient, nurse
and patient, and generally all persons who are in any relation of trust and confidence.”).
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Indeed, Leib has answered his own invitation, arguing that fiduciary
responsibilities should apply to judges, juries, and even friends.43 Evan Criddle and
Evan Fox-Decent have advocated the use of fiduciary principles to identify rules in
international relations that all states must obey like prohibitions on slavery,
genocide, and aggressive war. They anchor their analysis in the “state’s fiduciary
obligation to govern in accordance with principles of integrity, fairness, and
solicitude.”44 Evan Criddle has separately argued for the adoption of a “fiduciary
model” for agency rulemaking, one that requires regulators to honor the moral
dignity of the individuals subject to their rules, do so with the integrity and fairness
thought of as applying to fiduciaries, and to take action fairly, reasonably, and
transparently. The fiduciary model Criddle advocates also expands the scope—as
fiduciary duties do—for judicial review of agency action or inaction.45
In an important paper aimed at addressing the problem of medical providers’
overbilling of Medicare, Isaac Buck has argued for a fiduciary duty between
physicians and, effectively, taxpayers, so that Medicare may seek judicial remedies
for physicians’ breach of the duty of loyalty to payers.46 According to Buck, the
typical fiduciary duty that applies to physicians may be easily extended to
other entrustors:
After all, physicians occupy a position of trust, unlike the role one would
ascribe to sellers in other industries. . . . [I]n a professional medical
practice, trust between patient and physician is essential and . . . the
government as insurer depends upon the honesty of the doctor and is easily
taken advantage of if the doctor is not honest.47
In 2016, the Department of Labor advocated the application of a fiduciary
rule to investment advisers making recommendations pursuant to qualified
retirement plans and individual retirement accounts.48 That rule redefined the term
investment advice within pension and retirement plans. Under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA; Pub. L. No. 93-406), a person
who provides investment advice has a fiduciary obligation, which means that the
person must provide the advice in the sole interest of plan participants.49 Under the
prior regulation, securities brokers and dealers who provided services to retirement

43. Leib, supra note 1; Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael Serota, A Fiduciary Theory of
Judging, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 699 (2013); Ethan J. Leib, Michael Serota & David L. Ponet, Fiduciary
Principles and the Jury, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1109 (2014) (jurors and juries).
44. Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 1, at 333.
45. Criddle, supra note 1.
46. Buck, supra note 1, at 1055.
47. Id. at 1089 (citing United States v. Rutgard, 116 F.3d 1270, 1294 (9th Cir. 1997)).
48. Chamber of Com. v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., No. 17-10238, 2018 WL 3301737 (5th Cir. June
21, 2018), rev’g 231 F. Supp. 3d 152 (N.D. Tex. 2017); Mkt. Synergy Grp., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab.,
No. 16-CV-4083-DDC-KGS, 2017 WL 661592 (D. Kan. Feb. 17, 2017).
49. See Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment
Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2510, 2550), https://
www.federalregister.gov/documents/2016/04/08/2016-07924/definition-of-the-term-fiduciary-conflictof-interest-rule-retirement-investment-advice [ https://perma.cc/3P6N-8DQX ].
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plans and who were not fiduciaries were not required to act in the sole interests of
plan participants by, for example, disclosing conflicts of interest.50 Rather, their
recommendations had to meet a suitability standard, which requires that
recommendations be suitable for the plan participant, given factors such as an
individual’s income, risk tolerance, and investment objectives. The suitability
standard is a lower standard than a fiduciary standard.51 Although the rule is now
effectively dead, it represents a policy manifestation of the academic trends
described above.
The possibilities (and in some cases realities) are endless. Professors may be
fiduciaries with respect to their students.52 Parents may be fiduciaries to their
children.53 Employees are already fiduciaries in many respects for their employers
when an agency relationship forms, but what about to each other? Physicians owe
fiduciary duties to their patients, but what about pharmacists to their customers?54
Joshua Margolis has argued that publicly traded healthcare firms owe fiduciary
duties to both shareholders and patients.55 Internet and digital device users
worldwide vest a certain and sometimes large amount of trust in online platforms,
social media, and Internet service providers, so what about a fiduciary duty to
ensure that privacy is maintained, breaches are protected against, and equal access
to all web content (which now rescinded net neutrality rules were intended to
address)?56 Tamar Frankel, one of the most important voices in the law of
fiduciaries, has broadly “challenged lawmakers, lawyers, and judges to put trust and
fiduciary duty at the heart of modern law.”57
II. PHYSICIANS AS FIDUCIARIES
Advocates of the expansion of fiduciary duties to more relationships
frequently identify the physician-patient relationship as representative of the core
features of what might be gained should the analogy be extended.58 The physician
50. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4).
51. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3–21(j) (2017).
52. Melissa Astala, Comment, Wronged by a Professor? Breach of Fiduciary Duty as a Remedy in
Intellectual Property Infringement Cases, 3 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 31 (2003); Hazel Glenn Beh, Student
Versus University: The University’s Implied Obligations of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 59
MD. L. REV. 183, 202–03 (2000); Robert Faulkner, Judicial Deference to University Decisions Not to Grant
Degrees, Certificates, and Credit—The Fiduciary Alternative, 40 SYRACUSE L. REV. 837, 855–66 (1989);
Alvin L. Goldman, The University and the Liberty of Its Students—A Fiduciary Theory, 54
KY. L.J. 643 (1966).
53. Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401 (1995);
K.M. v. H.M., [1992] S.C.R. 3 (Can.).
54. Anonymous v. CVS Corp., 728 N.Y.S.2d 333 (Sup. Ct. 2001).
55. Joshua D. Margolis, Professionalism, Fiduciary Duty, and Health-Related Business Leadership,
313 JAMA 1819 (2015).
56. Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1183 (2016).
57. David J. Seipp, Trust and Fiduciary Duty in the Early Common Law, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1011,
1012 (2011).
58. See infra notes 61–65.
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is the learned, competent, and compassionate professional exercising her expertise
with the sole end of healing her patient (who knows little or nothing about disease
and pharmacology), alleviating her pain, or advising her on different aspects of
nutrition and wellness.59 This physician discloses all material risks of procedures and
therapies, scrupulously guards confidences entrusted to her by her patient, and
keeps detailed records that justify her decisions and advice.60 She treats her patient
to the standard of care that other physicians would agree would meet professional
expectations and does so free of financial or romantic interests that might cloud her
judgment.61 Often described as the “gatekeepers” to medical services, physicians are
in the position that makes patients reliant on them for access to medical aid, thus
creating a relationship of dependency.62 Advocates argue their fiduciary duties
“attach” at the beginning of the relationship—which is from the time the physician
agrees to treat the patient—and carry on throughout the time a patient is under the
physician’s care.63
According to Tamar Frankel, the patient’s entrustment of power over his or
her body to the physician—the essential trust of something vital—suffices to create
a fiduciary relationship between the two.64 Evan Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent
argue that the physician is a fiduciary because “[the patient] is peculiarly vulnerable
to the [physician]’s power in the sense that she is unable, either as a matter of fact
or law, to exercise the entrusted power.”65 Health law scholars and professional
organizations concur. Dayna Matthew argues that “[c]urrent applications of
fiduciary law are pervasive in the medical context and are firmly based on the
well-established ethical responsibilities that providers historically owed to their
patients.”66 The American Medical Association (AMA) has recognized that the
physician-patient relationship is “based on trust,” and thus the physician has an
obligation to place patients’ welfare above her own self-interest.67 In a
comprehensive analysis of physicians’ fiduciary duties under state law, Max

59. M.A. v. United States, 951 P.2d 851, 854 (Alaska 1998) (“[W]e have recognized that the
unique nature of the physician-patient relationship confers upon physicians a fiduciary responsibility
toward their patients.”).
60. See Thomas L. Hafemeister & Selina Spinos, Lean on Me: A Physician’s Fiduciary Duty to
Disclose an Emergent Medical Risk to the Patient, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1167, 1187 (2009).
61. See Wohlgemuth v. Meyer, 293 P.2d 816, 820 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956); Witherell v. Weimer, 421
N.E.2d 869 (Ill. 1981), superseded by statute, 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 / 13-215 (2019).
62. Hafemeister & Spinos, supra note 60, at 1186.
63. Thomas H. Boyd, Cost Containment and the Physician’s Fiduciary Duty to the Patient, 39
DEPAUL L. REV. 131, 137 (1989).
64. TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 17 (2011).
65. Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 1, at 349.
66. Matthew, supra note 11, at 730.
67. AM. MED. ASS’N, Chapter 1: Opinions on Patient-Physician Relationships, in CODE OF
MEDICAL ETHICS, at Op. 1.1.1 (2016), https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/codemedical-ethics-overview [ https://perma.cc/UG3L-ZKP8 ].
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Mehlman has argued that “regarding physicians as fiduciaries for their patients is
essential not only for patients but for physicians.”68
All of this more or less reflects reality, so far as it goes. 69 Physicians, especially
in the United States, are among the most robustly trained and vetted professionals
worldwide.70 They are indeed in a relationship of immense trust from frequently ill
and vulnerable patients, and the potential conflicts of interest that might taint their
decision-making are generally disclosed and transparent for patients to see and
understand.71 Physicians and their supporting medical provider networks keep
detailed records as to almost every step in the treatment process.72 The only part
that is wrong is that it is the fiduciary relationship, legally enforced by courts, that
has gotten us here.
The following analysis examines what courts have stated physicians’ fiduciary
duties include, whether or not those courts ever held physicians accountable for
those duties.
A. Physicians’ Duty of Loyalty
For nearly all fiduciary relationships, the core duty is that of loyalty, to avoid
conflicts of interest that may jeopardize the obligation of the fiduciary to act on
behalf of the trustee alone.73 In the Republic, Plato wrote that “[N]o physician, in so
far as he is a physician, considers his own good in what he prescribes, but the good
of his patient; for the true physician is . . . not a mere money-maker.”74 In 1760,
fiduciary law was first adopted in colonial America to “protect patients in
relationships with physician providers.”75
As with many fiduciaries, the possible conflicts of interest are manifold,
pervasive, and, for physicians, operate at both primary (payment to physicians for
services) and secondary (profit for recommending drugs or devices in which the

68. Maxwell J. Mehlman, Why Physicians Are Fiduciaries for Their Patients, 12 IND. HEALTH
L. REV. 1, 57 (2015).
69. See Jessica Mantel, A Defense of Physicians’ Gatekeeping Role: Balancing Patients’ Needs with
Society’s Interests, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 633, 643–44 (2015).
70. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Victor R. Fuchs, Shortening Medical Training by 30%, 307 JAMA
1143, 1144 (2012).
71. Mehlman, supra note 68.
72. Christine Sinsky, Lacey Colligan, Ling Li, Mirela Prgomet, Sam Reynolds, Lindsey Goeders,
Johanna Westbrook, Michael Tutty & George Blike, Allocation of Physician Time in Ambulatory
Practice: A Time and Motion Study in 4 Specialties, 165 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 753, 753–60 (2016),
http://annals.org/aim/fullarticle/2546704/allocation-physician-time-ambulatory-practice-time-motionstudy-4-specialties [ https://perma.cc/6AQU-7H6E ].
73. State ex rel. McCloud v. Seier, 567 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Mo. 1978) (en banc) (“Moreover, as this
[fiduciary] duty contemplates the physician’s undivided loyalty to his patient, such duty necessarily runs
contrary to the dual allegiance that would result if the physician were employed and paid by his
patient’s adversary.”).
74. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 17 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Cosimo Classics 2008) (1888).
75. Matthew, supra note 11, at 719.
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physician has a financial stake) levels. Frances Miller detailed the potential conflicts
of interest that face physicians in modern practice:
At a fundamental level a patient’s best interests will not always coincide
with what seems to be the physician’s most advantageous financial or
professional position. Physicians are uniquely situated to persuade patients
to purchase medical services, for patients rarely possess the sophisticated
diagnostic skills that would prompt them to second guess physician advice.
Moreover, when physicians are paid on a fee-for-service basis, their income
increases the more services they provide, regardless of whether the patient
actually needs them. If the physician works for a profit-sharing
independent practice association (IPA) or health maintenance organization
(HMO), the fewer services he or she provides the more money the
physician makes at the end of the year . . . . The . . . possibility of conflict
of interest at this primary level is inevitable because of one or another of
these economic incentives.
A different kind of conflict of interest . . . is involved when physicians
derive secondary income from the care they order for their patients. This
happens whenever physicians own substantial equity interests in medical
service organizations to which they refer patients.76
In their review of the evidence regarding physician conflicts of interest,
Christopher Robertson, Susannah Rose, and Aaron Kesselheim found that across
specialties and therapies, physicians tended to order more diagnostics, tests, and
procedures when they held a financial interest in the firms or facilities conducting
those services.77 In some circumstances, these self-referrals were also associated
with adverse patient outcomes.78
Arguing for a fiduciary duty applicable between physicians and Medicare,
Buck cites the preference for physicians to prescribe Lucentis, a drug used to treat
age-related macular degeneration, to Avastin, a far cheaper drug that has been
shown to be equally effective but which has not been equally prescribed.79 The
reason for this is the incentive Medicare Part B creates by reimbursing the
prescribing-physicians for the average price of the drug plus six percent every time
they use it on a patient.80 Federal and state courts have acknowledged that “gifts or
compensation from drug companies influence medical professionals’ treatment

76. Frances H. Miller, Secondary Income from Recommended Treatment: Should Fiduciary Principles
Constrain Physician Behavior?, in THE NEW HEALTH CARE FOR PROFIT: DOCTORS AND HOSPITALS
IN A COMPETITIVE ENVIROMENT 153, 154–55 (Bradford H. Gray ed., 1983), https://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK216764/ [ https://perma.cc/N9EQ-TMM7 ].
77. See Christopher Robertson, Susannah Rose & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Effect of Financial
Relationships on the Behaviors of Health Care Professionals: A Review of the Evidence, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
452, 463 (2012).
78. See id. at 462–63.
79. See Buck, supra note 1, at 1055.
80. Id. at 1056 (noting that Lucentis gains the doctors $120 per dose versus Avastin at $3
per dose).
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decisions” in ways that implicate physicians’ fiduciary duty of loyalty.81 Yet courts
have “resisted efforts” to allow patients to challenge physician conduct based on
breach of that duty.82
B. Physicians’ Duty of Candor
Physicians’ duty of candor or disclosure is broad and includes not only
revealing personal interests that may affect the objectivity of advice given or
treatment recommended, but also material risks related to those prescriptions and
informed consent more broadly.83 Originally involving nonconsensual touching of
the body by a physician, informed consent was made actionable under the tort
theory of battery, anchored as it is in the dignity that comes with bodily autonomy.84
Battery theory emphasized that “every human being of adult years and sound mind
has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body.”85
Since its first official appearance in 1957, informed consent has been
significantly expanded.86 Now situated in medical negligence, a physician has a duty
to disclose to a patient the material risks associated with a proposed procedure when
a reasonable patient would need to hear that information to make an
informed decision.87
Indeed, patients have been far more successful at challenging physicians’
fiduciary duty of candor than the duty of loyalty because courts extend such
deference to physicians’ treatment decisions and confuse fiduciary duty and

81. Murthy v. Abbott Lab’ys, 847 F. Supp. 2d 958, 971, 972 (S.D. Tex. 2012); see Garcia
v. Coffman, 946 P.2d 216, 219, 221, 226 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997).
82. Hall, supra note 5, at 493.
83. Hales v. Pittman, 576 P.2d 493, 497 (Ariz. 1978) (“However, because of the fiduciary
relationship between physician and patient, the scope of the disclosure required can be expanded by
the patient’s instructions to the physician.”); Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1101–02 (Kan. 1960)
(“The courts frequently state that the relation between the physician and his patient is a fiduciary one,
and therefore the physician has an obligation to make a full and frank disclosure to the patient of all
pertinent facts related to his illness.”); Jacobs v. Painter, 530 A.2d 231, 239 (Me. 1987) (“Dr. Painter’s
duty to disclose arose, as it always has, from the fiduciary character of the physician-patient
relationship.”); Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.2d 647, 650 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1971) (“[A] physician’s duty to
disclose is . . . imposed by law which governs his conduct in the same manner as others in a similar
fiduciary relationship.”). In the context of fiduciary duties more generally, Professor Thomas Gallanis
has observed that “[a]cademic writing has concentrated on the other fiduciary duties, such as loyalty,
prudence, and impartiality. The duty to inform is due for scholarly treatment.” T.P. Gallanis, The
Trustee’s Duty to Inform, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1595, 1596 (2007).
84. See Jay Katz, Informed Consent—Must It Remain A Fairy Tale?, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH
L. & POL’Y 69, 73, 77–78 (1994); Krista J. Sterken, Michael B. Van Sicklen & Norman Fost, Mandatory
Informed Consent Disclosures in the Diagnostic Context: Sometimes Less Is More, 17
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 107 (2013).
85. Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1912). See generally Sharon Nan
Perley, From Control over One’s Body to Control over One’s Body Parts: Extending the Doctrine of Informed
Consent, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 335 (1992).
86. See Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957).
87. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (establishing the first objective
standard in informed consent cases).
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malpractice inquiries (a point further developed in Part III).88 In the well-known
case of Moore v. The Regents of the University of California, the patient sued the doctor
who treated him for hairy cell leukemia, challenging the physician’s orders to
remove his spleen as well as “blood, bone marrow aspirate, and other bodily
substances” as conflicted with the physician’s intent to use those substances in
potentially lucrative clinical research.89 The Supreme Court of California in Moore
determined that the physician had breached his fiduciary duty, not of loyalty, but of
disclosure, since the economic interest of a physician may be material to a patient’s
decision.90 “[A] physician who is seeking a patient’s consent for a medical procedure
must, in order to satisfy his fiduciary duty and to obtain the patient’s informed
consent, disclose personal interests unrelated to the patient’s health, whether
research or economic, that may affect his medical judgment.”91
In that decision, the court adopted the “reasonable patient” standard when
determining materiality.92 Most courts have in fact adopted a “reasonable physician”
inquiry that operates much like a standard of care analysis privileging physicians’
opinions of one another, not the trust relationship they share with the patient.93
Several courts have held that physicians have an affirmative duty to disclose
information that will affect a patient’s care.94 For instance, not only do physicians
have an affirmative duty to disclose to patients any financial interest in clinical
research,95 some have “imposed a duty on physicians to reveal financial incentives
received in a Health Maintenance Organization (“HMO”) contract to hold down
costs by refusing to order additional tests or by making referrals to specialists.”96 In
88. Billings v. Sisters of Mercy, 389 P.2d 224, 228 (Idaho 1964) (“[I]t is now generally held that
the fiduciary relationship between physician and patient imposes a duty of disclosure, breach of which
constitutes fraudulent concealment.”); McCormick v. England, 494 S.E.2d 431, 436–37
(S.C. Ct. App. 1997) (“The jurisdictions that recognize the duty of confidentiality have relied on various
theories for the cause of action, including invasion of privacy, breach of implied contract, medical
malpractice, and breach of a fiduciary duty or a duty of confidentiality.”).
89. Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 485 n.10 (Cal. 1990).
90. Id. at 485.
91. Id.
92. Nadia N. Sawicki, The Abortion Informed Consent Debate: More Light, Less Heat, 21
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 19 (2011); Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 354 (Utah 1980) (“The
relationship between a doctor and his patient creates a duty in the physician to disclose to his patient
any material information concerning the patient’s physical condition. This duty to inform stems from
the fiduciary nature of the relationship . . . .”).
93. 4 LEONARD J. NELSON III, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 22.05 (2020) (reporting that the
reasonable patient standard “remains the minority position”). In states using the reasonable physician
standard, a physician would only be required to disclose “an interest extraneous to the patient’s health”
if other physicians customarily did so. Moore, 793 P.2d at 484.
94. Emmett v. E. Dispensary & Cas. Hosp., 396 F.2d 931, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (“We find in
the fiducial qualities of that relationship [between physician and patient] the physician’s duty to reveal
to the patient that which in his best interests it is important that he should know.”).
95. See Marc A. Rodwin, Strains in the Fiduciary Metaphor: Divided Physician Loyalties and
Obligations in a Changing Health Care System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 242, 248 (2005).
96. Richard W. Bourne, Medical Malpractice: Should Courts Force Doctors to Confess Their Own
Negligence to Their Patients?, 61 ARK. L. REV. 621, 641 (citing Shea v. Esensten, 208 F.3d 712, 717 (8th
Cir. 2000)).
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addition to holding HIV-infected physicians liable under an “informed-consent
theory,” for treating patients without disclosing their HIV status, some courts have
held that the “refusal of a physician to reveal financial or other interests is a breach
of fiduciary duty.”97 Furthermore, physicians are required to disclose “emergent
medical risks” to patients that they are either the cause of through medical error, or
that they discover during the course of treatment of something unrelated to the
emergent medical risk.98 The duty of candor is so strong, under the fiduciary
relationship, that a few courts have concluded that failure to disclose is tantamount
to active concealment.99
C. Physicians’ Duty of Care
Once the doctor-patient relationship is established, physicians, like attorneys,
corporate directors, and other fiduciaries are under an obligation to perform their
professional activities carefully and competently, generally as judged by the
prevailing standards of professional competence in the relevant field of medicine.100
While typically adjudicated as malpractice actions, courts have confirmed the duty
of care as one of physicians’ fiduciary duties.101
The distinction between deviation of the standard of care as a fiduciary and
that of any other ordinary actor owing someone else a duty (ordinary negligence) is
significant.102 Corporate directors and general partners, for example, must be guilty
of “gross negligence” before courts will impose liability for violation of the fiduciary

97. Id. at 641 (citing Moore, 793 P.2d at 485); Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 339 (Md. 1993);
Estate of Behringer v. Med. Ctr. at Princeton, 592 A.2d 1251, 1283 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991)
(holding that disclosure of HIV-positive status was required under hospital’s informed-consent
doctrine)).
98. AM. MED. ASS’N, Chapter 8: Ethics for Physicians & the Health of the Community, in CODE
OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 67, at Op. 8.12.
99. Guy v. Schuldt, 138 N.E.2d 891, 895 (Ind. 1956) (“Usually, there must be some active effort
on the part of one to be guilty of concealment but where a fiduciary or confidential relationship exists,
such as physician-patient, there exists a duty to disclose material information between the parties and a
failure to do so results in concealment.”); Daniel Sperling, (Re)disclosing Physician Financial
Interests: Rebuilding Trust or Making Unreasonable Burdens on Physicians?, 20 MED. HEALTH CARE
& PHILOS. 179, 181–82 (2017).
100. Nestorowich v. Ricotta, 767 N.E.2d 125, 128 (N.Y. 2002).
101. Toman v. Creighton Mem’l St. Josephs Hosp., Inc., 217 N.W.2d 484, 489 (Neb. 1974)
(“‘Malpractice’ has been defined by the court as the treatment of a case by a surgeon or physician in a
manner contrary to the accepted rules and with injurious results to the patient; hence, any professional
misconduct or any unreasonable lack of skill or fidelity in the performance of professional or fiduciary
duties.”); Georgetown Realty v. Home Ins. Co., 831 P.2d 7, 14 n.7 (Or. 1991) (“The form of action for
a claim against a fiduciary for breaching a duty of care arising from the relationship is not materially
different from a claim against a physician, a lawyer, or an engineer for breaching a duty of care arising
from such a relationship.”).
102. See, e.g., Christopher K. Odinet, The Unfinished Business of Dodd-Frank: Reforming the
Mortgage Contract, 69 SMU L. REV. 653, 675–76 (2016) (analyzing the relevance of the absence of such
a duty on lenders).
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duty of care.103 For attorneys, physicians, and many other fiduciaries, courts have
equated breaches of the fiduciary duty of care with malpractice, imposing ordinary
negligence and preponderance of the evidence standards when adjudicating claims
by beneficiaries.104
After the physician relationship is established, the patient must prove the
applicable standard of care and then establish the physician’s deviation from that
standard to the patient’s detriment.105 Generally, the standard of care is the “degree
of skill and care that would ordinarily be exercised by an average physician in similar
circumstance.”106 Specialists are required to exercise a higher degree of skill and care
in their area of expertise.107 Due to the complex nature of medical malpractice
litigation, physicians are almost always retained to be expert witnesses.108
The physician’s duty of care includes numerous related obligations.109 Those
obligations include retention of a competent support staff, making and keeping
adequate records, keeping current with diagnostic and treatment advances, and
maintaining privileges with necessary healthcare facilities.110 These obligations
clarify that physicians must minimize any potential interference with their ability to
treat patients once the physician-patient relationship has been established. Doctors
are also held to the duty of “technical competence,”111 which includes completing

103. Julian Velasco, A Defense of the Corporate Law Duty of Care, 40 J. CORP. L. 647, 653–54
(2015); Joseph W. Yockey, Does Social Enterprise Law Matter?, 66 ALA. L. REV. 767 (analyzing the
adaptation of fiduciary duties in the benefit corporation context).
104. Schieffer v. Cath. Archdiocese of Omaha, 508 N.W.2d 907, 912 (Neb. 1993) (holding that
parishioner’s breach of fiduciary duty claim against priest was not actionable as it was “merely another
way of alleging that the defendant grossly abused his pastoral role, that is, he engaged in malpractice”);
Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 9 Cl. Ct. 227, 258 (1985) (holding that trustee’s standard of
care is determined by the circumstances of time and place that surrounded the trustee when he took or
failed to take the action in question); Himel v. Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co., 596 F.2d 205, 209 n.4
(7th Cir. 1979) (finding that under Illinois law, breach of fiduciary duty will result from violations of
obligations of a trustee in carrying out the trust according to its terms of care and diligence in protecting
and investing trust property and of exercising good faith); Wright v. Nimmons, 641
F. Supp. 1391, 1402 (S.D. Tex. 1986) (holding that a trustee must exercise at least that degree of care
that a reasonably prudent person would devote to his own affairs under like circumstances).
105. Meghan C. O’Connor, The Physician-Patient Relationship and the Professional Standard of
Care: Reevaluating Medical Negligence Principles to Achieve the Goals of Tort Reform, 46 TORT TRIAL
& INS. PRAC. L.J. 109, 117 (2010).
106. John W. Ely, Arthur J. Hartz, Paul A. James & Cynda A. Johnnson, Determining the
Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice: The Physician’s Perspective, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 861,
862 (2002).
107. Cara E. Davies & Randi Zlotnik Shaul, Physician’s Legal Duty of Care and Legal Right to
Refuse to Work During a Pandemic, 18 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N J. 167, 167 (2010).
108. Chris Taylor, The Use of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Determining Standard of Care, 35
J. LEGAL MED. 273, 273 (2014).
109. Stigliano v. Connaught Lab’ys, Inc., 658 A.2d 715, 720 (N.J. 1995) (“The relationship
between treating physicians and their patients, sometimes described as fiduciary in nature, gives rise to
a duty to testify in judicial proceedings about treatment rendered to the patient.”).
110. Boyd, supra note 63, at 139.
111. Rodwin, supra note 95, at 249.
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continuing education courses and consulting outside medical professions
“when indicated.”112
D. Physicians’ Duty of Confidentiality
The fiduciary relationship between doctors and patients “arises from the trust
and confidence patients place in physicians to operate in good faith, remain loyal to
their patients, and subordinate their own self-interest and the interests of others.”113
While professional canons also speak to the duty of confidentiality, courts have also
read that obligation to be part of the broader fiduciary duties that physicians owe
patients.114 Because trust is essential to the functioning of the fiduciary relationship,
confidence provides an important assurance to the entrustor seeking advice.115
Throughout treatment, the physician is bound to “ensure the confidentiality of the
relationship, and, most significantly, to provide a level of care that meets accepted
standards in the profession.”116 Unauthorized disclosures of patient information are
actionable for damages precisely to ensure the integrity of physician-patient
communications.117
As with duties of loyalty and candor, courts have developed exceptions. Marc
Rodwin has noted that while “[p]sychiatrists owe loyalty to their patients” they are
also expected to abrogate that loyalty under certain circumstances that pose risks to
the safety of others118 In Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, the Supreme
Court of California determined that mental health physicians must protect third
parties threatened with bodily harm by their patients, including through
disclosure.119 In addition, physicians are required to report certain contagious
diseases, and physicians whose patients have HIV are “ethically obligated to divulge

112. AM. MED. ASS’N, AMA Principles of Medical Ethics, in CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra
note
67,
https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/default/files/media-browser/principles-of-medicalethics.pdf [ https://perma.cc/PEQ6-RJNF].
113. Matthew, supra note 11, at 726.
114. McCormick v. England, 494 S.E.2d 431, 435 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997) (“A majority of the
jurisdictions faced with the issue have recognized a cause of action against a physician for the
unauthorized disclosure of confidential information unless the disclosure is compelled by law or is in
the patient’s interest or the public interest.”).
115. Maxwell J. Mehlman, The Patient-Physician Relationship in an Era of Scarce Resources: Is
There a Duty to Treat?, 25 CONN. L. REV. 349, 369 (1993); Gracey v. Eaker, 837 So. 2d 348, 354
(Fla. 2002) (“These cases are also persuasive authority and support our conclusion that a
psychotherapist who has created a fiduciary relationship with his client owes that client a duty of
confidentiality, and that a breach of such duty is actionable in tort.”); Domako v. Rowe, 475 N.W.2d
30, 34 (Mich. 1991); Parris v. Limes, 277 P.3d 1259, 1265 n.3 (Okla. 2012) (“Oklahoma has long
recognized that the relationship between a physician and patient is a fiduciary and
confidential relationship.”).
116. Boyd, supra note 63, at 137.
117. Tehven v. Job Serv. N.D., 488 N.W.2d 48, 51 (N.D. 1992) (“Courts have generally
recognized a patient’s right to recover damages from a physician for unauthorized disclosure of medical
information as . . . [a] breach of the fiduciary relationship between a physician and a patient.”).
118. Rodwin, supra note 95, at 251–52.
119. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 345–46 (Cal. 1976).
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a patient’s confidences and warn sexual partners known to be at risk
of contagion.”120
E. Physicians’ Duty of Good Faith
Broadly, courts have encompassed physicians’ fiduciary duties with an
ultimate obligation to act in good faith.121 Courts have admonished physicians not
only “to act in their patients’ best interest [as part of their fiduciary duty],” but to
also “deal fairly with their patients, while eschewing kickbacks, excessive services,
and improper referrals.”122 The latter breaches of good faith, as in the corporate
context, overlap significantly with the duty of loyalty. As Dayna Bowen Matthew
notes, the good faith and fair dealing aspect of physicians’ fiduciary duties have
been given central importance by courts:
Some courts have a long-established history of acknowledging the
fiduciary nature of the physician-patient relationship in medical
malpractice cases, holding that the provider’s fiduciary duty arises from the
trust and confidence patients place in physicians to operate in good faith,
remain loyal to their patients, and subordinate their own self-interest and
the interests of others.123
III. THE LIMITATIONS AND STRUCTURAL INCAPACITY OF COURTS TO REMEDY
BREACHES OF PHYSICIANS’ FIDUCIARY DUTIES
Despite the lofty rhetoric courts attach to the fiduciary relationship between
physicians and patients, they have been largely reluctant to enforce fiduciary duties,
per se, against physicians. Indeed, prominent scholars of the physician-patient
relationship have noted the actual application of a physician’s fiduciary duty is
“sparse”124 and rarely applied in such a way as to vindicate the relationship as a truly
fiduciary one.125 Numerous structural factors explain why courts hesitate to fully

120. Rodwin, supra note 95, at 252; Ad Hoc Comm. on Med. Ethics, American College of
Physicians Ethics Manual. Part I: History of Medical Ethics, The Physician and the Patient, The Physician’s
Relationship to Other Physicians, The Physician and Society, 101 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 129, 134
(1984), cited in Mehlman, supra note 68, at 9 n.8.
121. Black v. Littlejohn, 325 S.E.2d 469, 482 (N.C. 1985) (“The relationship of patient and
physician is generally considered a fiduciary one, imposing upon the physician the duty of good faith
and fair dealing.”); Tracy v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 569 N.E.2d 875, 879 (Ohio 1991) (“The
physician-patient relationship is a fiduciary one based on trust and confidence and obligating the
physician to exercise good faith.”).
122. Matthew, supra note 11, at 728–29.
123. Id. at 726.
124. Hafemeister & Spinos, supra note 60, at 1167.
125. Rodwin, supra note 95, at 255; Michelle Oberman, Mothers and Doctors’ Orders: Unmasking
the Doctor’s Fiduciary Role in Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 451, 459–68 (2000) (describing
challenges to physicians’ loyalty); see also Mehlman, supra note 68, at 10 n.9 (noting that in three
states—Alabama, Delaware, and Minnesota—courts have rejected the fiduciary metaphor for the
physician-patient relationship).
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execute the relationship, factors that would apply with equal force to the
proliferating regimes advocates of more fiduciary duties now propose.
A. The Rules of Civil Procedure Confound Fiduciary Duties
Under both federal and state rules of civil procedure, plaintiffs must bring all
their claims arising out of the same transactional nucleus of facts in the same civil
action.126 Judicial efficiency and res judicata favor disposition of cases
comprehensively so that litigation ends once the rights of the parties have been
determined.127 In the case of patients with claims against physicians, they will by
these principles be required to bring common law claims in contract and other torts,
as they do, in addition to claims for breach of fiduciary duty.128 These former claims
often have advantageous features from the perspective of trial judges—more
questions are clearly factual and reserved for the jury; fewer equitable remedies that
require judicial intervention; and clearer law, especially binding judicial precedent.
Remedies for breaches of fiduciary duties require far more extensive
involvement of courts in private law relationships than remedies available in
common law actions sounding in contract or other tort claims.129 Disgorgement,
for example, would require the court to undertake a thorough examination of the
profits made by a disloyal physician, whereas compensatory damages in a
malpractice action require only an assessment of the evidence a patient-plaintiff
would submit through the normal discovery and trial process.130 As Einer Elhauge
concluded in the antitrust context, “the rare usage of disgorgement actions thus
seems to have been based mainly on a general premise that private actions already

126. William A. Fletcher, “Common Nucleus of Operative Fact” and Defensive Set-Off: Beyond the
Gibbs Test, 74 IND. L.J. 171, 171 (1998) (“Under the influence of modern procedural rules encouraging
liberal joinder of parties and claims, the size of a permissible unit of litigation has substantially increased
in this century. In both state and federal courts the goal of these joinder rules has been to foster
procedural fairness and judicial efficiency, ‘to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action.’” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1)).
127. Albrecht Zeuner & Harald Koch, Effects of Judgments (Res Judicata), in 16
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW ONLINE ¶ 25 (Mauro Cappelletti ed.,
2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2589-4021_IECO_COM_160903 [ https://perma.cc/6NXPLGK6 ] (“The main purpose inherent in the concept of res judicata is to ensure that once a matter has
been decided further controversy or uncertainty about it is eliminated. This implies on the procedural
level that the rendering of an inconsistent decision concerning the same subject matter must be
prevented. For as long as the possibility remains that a different judgment may be rendered in a new
proceeding, legal certainty has not yet been achieved and the litigation is not yet finally concluded.”).
128. See, e.g., Stephen R. Feldman & Thomas M. Ward, Psychotherapeutic Injury: Reshaping the
Implied Contract as an Alternative to Malpractice, 58 N.C. L. REV. 63, 77 (1979).
129.
Mary C. Burdette & Scott D. Weber, Remedies for Breach of Fiduciary Duty 1 (June
26–28, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.dallasprobatelawfirm.com/documents/
Remedies-For-Breach-Of-Fiduciary-Duty.pdf [ https://perma.cc/J3BW-GJHF ].
130. ERI Consulting Eng’rs, Inc. v. Swinnea, 318 S.W.3d 867, 873 (Tex. 2010) (“[C]ourts may
fashion equitable remedies such as profit disgorgement and fee forfeiture to remedy a breach of
fiduciary duty.”).
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provide adequate monetary relief, so that disgorgement claims would not provide
an additional benefit.”131
B. Courts Reject Patients’ Fiduciary Duty Claims
Courts routinely reject attempts by patients to vindicate fiduciary duties owed
to them by physicians in favor of medical malpractice suits that feature adversarial
discovery, jury determinations, and passive involvement of judges. This is true for
all the duties identified above. In Hales v. Pittman, the Arizona Supreme Court was
explicit in its preference for medical malpractice rather than breach of fiduciary duty
actions for breach of the duty of candor:
Additionally, if an undisclosed risk occurs, a patient may pursue a
malpractice action premised on a negligence theory. We do not believe that
the law in Arizona should be extended to recognize a new cause of action
based on breach of trust when an adequate remedy for this case already
exists. To do otherwise would ignore the underlying premise that the
patient controls his own destiny.132
Interpreting Kansas law, a federal district court declared that all physician
fiduciary duties were subsumed by medical malpractice actions based on the same
acts or omissions:
Under Kansas law, a plaintiff who brings a claim against a doctor or
hospital for failure to perform the legal duty to exercise reasonable care,
skill and diligence in the treatment of a patient may not also maintain other
claims against the doctor or hospital for actions that arise from the same
series of events as the underlying malpractice claim. . . . Kansas courts will
not permit a plaintiff to “creatively classify” a claim as something other
than one for medical malpractice if the substance of the claim concerns the
physician-patient relationship.133
The Nebraska Supreme Court declared that “any professional misconduct or
any unreasonable lack of skill or fidelity in the performance of professional or
fiduciary duties is ‘malpractice’ and comes within the professional or malpractice
statute of limitations.”134 Similarly, in New Mexico, “it is this affirmative duty of
full and fair disclosure that is at the heart . . . of fiduciary duty. However, the failure
of a physician to disclose the factors that might influence a patient in his decision is
a negligence cause of action that is triable by jury.”135 In Minnesota (one of three
jurisdictions to broadly reject fiduciary duties for physicians) an appellate court
determined that such an action might be plausible where the underlying facts are
independent of medical diagnosis, treatment, and care.136 Ohio, Texas, and

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Einer Elhauge, Disgorgement as an Antitrust Remedy, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 79, 83 (2009).
Hales v. Pittman, 576 P.2d 493, 497 (Ariz. 1978).
Kernke v. Menninger Clinic, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1354 (D. Kan. 2001).
Colton v. Dewey, 321 N.W.2d 913, 917 (Neb. 1982).
Garcia v. Coffman, 946 P.2d 216, 223 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997).
D.A.B. v. Brown, 570 N.W.2d 168, 171–72 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
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Washington courts have similarly wrapped fiduciary duty claims up with malpractice
claims. In Delaware, fiduciary duties for physicians were rejected altogether because
the Delaware Supreme Court reserved its courts of chancery for the core
responsibility of adjudicating disputes involving corporate fiduciaries.137
Indeed, Anna Laakmann has observed:
[D]espite frequent incantations of fiduciary principles, courts have
enforced physicians’ fiduciary duties in a haphazard, ad hoc manner. While
medical ethical codes and case law routinely pronounce physicians as
fiduciaries, the legal substance behind this label remains elusive. Courts’
vague characterization of physicians’ fiduciary duties offers woefully little
guidance on the legally permissible bounds of physician behavior under
conditions of endogenous uncertainty.138
C. Courts De-Trust the Duty of Care
The physician’s duty of care, as a fiduciary matter, should ensure that her
practice matches her level of competence, deficiencies in knowledge or ability, and
efforts to obtain help when needed. In terms of individual patient care, physicians
should provide medical care based on objective evidence whenever possible. This
includes demonstrating a sense of inquiry and taking a scientific approach to solving
clinical issues for the benefit of the patient.139
As a historical matter, courts rarely analyzed the duty of care as a function of
the fiduciary relationship with patients. Rather, courts focused on physician-patient
disputes as a matter of evidence, with which they were structurally better suited to
assess. As Mark Hall has surmised, courts have found that “evidence of financial
incentives would tend to unfairly inflame jurors, and they have resisted efforts to
craft legal theories based on fiduciary law that would circumvent conventional
medical malpractice standards.”140
In claims by patients against physicians, the standard of care must almost
always be established through expert testimony.141 Expert witnesses typically
formulate their opinions on the standard of care “by combining their own personal
experience and knowledge of customary practices with their knowledge of the

137. Mehlman, supra note 68, at 22.
138. Anna B. Laakmann, When Should Physicians Be Liable for Innovation?, 36 CARDOZO
L. REV. 913, 955–56 (2015).
139. Alfredo D. Espinosa-Brito, Rapid Response: The Clinical Method Is the Scientific Method
Applied to the Care of a Patient, Response to Doctors Are Not Scientists, BMJ (June 27, 2004), https://
www.bmj.com/rapid-response/2011/10/30/clinical-method-scientific-method-applied-care-patient
[ https://perma.cc/5CRK-WWG3 ].
140. Hall, supra note 5, at 493.
141. Carney-Hayes v. Nw. Wis. Home Care, Inc., 699 N.W. 2d 524, 537 (Wis. 2005).
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medical literature.”142 Courts have historically given great weight to customary
practices among physicians.143
The use of physician custom gave rise to judicially crafted rules that made
actions challenging physician competence difficult. “Locality” rules, for example,
required patients to find an expert in the community to testify on their behalf as to
the applicable standard of care, even though doing so forced even sympathetic
physicians to choose between their local reputation (a core objective of the fiduciary
relationship) and testifying on behalf of injured patients.144 In Small v. Howard, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court determined that the defendant-surgeon “was
bound to possess that skill only which physicians and surgeons of ordinary ability
and skill, practi[cing] in similar localities.”145 Many states adopted and expanded this
rule. Expert testimony by physicians who were not familiar with the local practices
were inadmissible.146 Finding an expert within the defendant’s community was rare
as many physicians refused to testify, thus leaving the plaintiff to outsource to
“national” witnesses. 147
Technological advances and persistent “conspiracy of silence” did result in
some abandonment of locality rules in favor of national standards of care.148 The
majority of states have now adopted a “national standard of care” based on the
expansion of healthcare resources and the nationalization of medical school
curriculum. The national standard of care requires physicians to act with the degree
of skill and care ordinarily possessed by a reasonable and prudent physician in the
same medical specialty acting under the same or similar circumstances.149
Yet the evolution of national standards of care has been gradual, and large
jurisdictions with national medical schools retain locality rules. “Of 2007, 21 states
maintained a version of the locality rule and 29 states followed a national
standard.150 Of the 21 states that followed a version of the locality rule, 3 followed
a statewide standard, 2 the same-community standard, 11 the same- or
142. Glenn E. Bradford, The “Respectable Minority” Doctrine in Missouri Medical Negligence
Law, 56 J. MO. BAR 326, 327 (2000); see also Fred L. Cohen, The Expert Medical Witness in Legal
Perspective, 25 J. LEGAL MED. 185, 191 (2004).
143. Peter Moffett & Gregory Moore, The Standard of Care: Legal History and Definitions: The
Bad and Good News, 12 W. J. EMERGENCY MED. 109, 110 (2011).
144. John M. Tyson, Comment, Statutory Standard of Care for North Carolina Health Care
Providers, 1 CAMPBELL L. REV. 111, 115–16 (2012); Cristina Carmody Tilley, Tort Law Inside Out, 126
YALE L.J. 1320, 1345 (2017) (“The Restatement’s discussion of negligence refers to ‘community’ more
than a dozen times, always as a source of liability standards. First, the Restatement squarely indicates that
the duty a defendant owes a plaintiff is contingent on the community in which the dispute takes place.”).
145. O’Connor, supra note 105, at 118; Small v. Howard, 128 Mass. 131, 136 (1880), overruled by
Brune v. Belinkoff, 235 N.E.2d 793, 798 (Mass. 1968).
146. Walls v. Boyett, 226 S.W.2d 552, 556 (Ark. 1950) (modifying locality rule to include same
general neighborhood).
147. Tyson, supra note 144, at 118.
148. O’Connor, supra note 105, at 120.
149. See generally Munro v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 263 Cal. Rptr. 878, 882 (Ct. App. 1989).
150. Brian K. Cooke, Elizabeth Worsham & Gary M. Reisfield, The Elusive Standard of Care,
45 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 358, 361 (2017).
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similar-community standard, and 5 the similar-community standard for general
practitioners and a national standard for specialists.”151
Even within states following national standards of care, rules of evidence
regarding scientific support for expert testimony vary significantly. For example,
even where there is a majority standard, courts permit physicians to enter evidence
as to a “respectable minority” judgment by a physician.152 The respectable minority
doctrine allows physicians choice in an alternative medicine approach to treatment
to not be seen as a deviation from the standard of care.153
With respect to other sources of evidence, clinical practice guidelines
originated as a means of improving the quality of care by attempting to create
uniformity across regional differences in clinical practice, balance overuse and
underuse of certain medical services, and provide a means for communicating
outcomes-based and cost-effective clinical practices to physicians.154 Clinical
practice guidelines are “a systematically developed statement to assist practitioner
and patient decisions about appropriate health care for specific clinical
circumstances.”155 The introduction of clinical practice guidelines into medical
malpractice litigation was intended to establish standards of care with more certainty
and less subjectivity.156
While the promise of the clinical practice guidelines was probably always
overestimated because of idiosyncratic patient needs, courts have nevertheless
turned them into another evidentiary complication, rarely using them to identify a
physician’s fiduciary duty of care to a patient.157 In many cases where guidelines are
admitted into evidence, they do not supply a source of conclusive evidence.158 In
Frakes v. Cardiology Consultants, P.C., for example, a physician presented a printed
table by the American Heart Associations to establish the standard of care for
interpreting exercise stress tests.159 The court allowed the chart into evidence not to
determine the standard of care, but because doing so would “organize the expert
testimony to assist the trier of fact to more easily understand a highly technical
151. Id.
152. Bradford, supra note 142, at 329.
153. Joseph H. King, Jr., Reconciling the Exercise of Judgment and the Objective Standard of Care
in Medical Malpractice, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 49, 57 (1999); Hall v. Hillbun, 466 So. 2d 856, 871
(Miss. 1985); McCourt v. Abernathy, 457 S.E.2d 603, 607 (S.C. 1995) (quoting jury instruction which
stated that “[s]uch differences [due] to preference . . . do not amount to malpractice”).
154. Michelle M. Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Medical
Malpractice Litigation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 645, 649 (2001).
155. Taylor, supra note 108, at 278 (quoting INST. OF MED. COMM. TO ADVISE THE
PUB. HEALTH SERVS. ON CLINIC PRACT. GUIDLINES, CLINICAL PRACTICE
GUILDELINES: DIRECTION FOR A NEW PROGRAM 1, 38 (Marilyn J. Field & Kathleen N. Lohr
eds., 1990)).
156. Sam A. McConkey, IV, Note, Simplifying the Law in Medical Malpractice: The Use of Practice
Guidelines as the Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 97 W. VA. L. REV. 491, 506 (1995).
157. Taylor, supra note 108, at 281; Mello, supra note 154, at 663–65.
158. Frakes v. Cardiology Consultants, P.C., No. 01-A-01-9702-CV-00069, 1997 WL 536949
(Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 1997); Hinlicky v. Dreyfuss, 848 N.E.2d 1285 (N.Y. 2006).
159. Frakes, 1997 WL 536949, at *2.
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subject.”160 In Hinlicky v. Dreyfuss, after a flowchart depicting clinical guidelines was
submitted, the court admitted it over a hearsay objection on the basis that it
illustrated the physician’s thought process, rather than as evidence of the standard
of care—a distinction it acknowledged might not matter to jurors.161
However, courts have also rejected clinical practice guidelines on the basis of
hearsay. In Greathouse v. Rhodes, the plaintiff attempted to introduce clinical practice
guidelines as evidence of the standard of care for the management of unstable
angina.162 The trial court refused (and the appellate court held it was not an abuse
of discretion to do so) because the guidelines were hearsay and not used for
purposes of impeachment.163 As one study concluded, courts have generally not
relied on clinical practice guidelines, “and when they have, they were
used conservatively.”164
The unpredictability of standards of care works haphazardly against both
patients and physicians.165 Courts have been known to jettison an accepted standard
and impose their own.166 In Helling v. Carey, a thirty-two-year-old woman suffered
severe damage to her eye after a physician failed to administer a glaucoma test.167
The Court ruled for the plaintiff even though the customary standard was for the
test to be administered to those over forty years old.168 The court applied, in essence,
the Hand Formula, determining that a low-cost measure with a high probability of
benefiting patients sufficed to establish the applicable standard of care.169
D. Implications for Current Proposals
These structural judicial limitations would almost certainly confront the
regimes now being advocated by fiduciary proponents. Consider the fiduciary duty
Buck proposes for medical providers who bill Medicare. Under the regime he
envisages, Medicare would be able to pursue breach of fiduciary duty claims against

160. Id. at *4.
161. Hinlicky, 848 N.E.2d at 1291.
162. Greathouse v. Rhodes, 618 N.W.2d 106 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (discussing plaintiff’s
allegation that defendant failed to properly diagnose and treat an unstable angina that caused a heart
attack and death), rev’d on other grounds, 636 N.W.2d 138 (Mich. 2001).
163. Id. at 115.
164. Douglas S. Ruhl & Gil Siegal, Medical Malpractice Implications of Clinical Practice
Guidelines, 157 OTOLARYNGOLOGY–HEAD & NECK SURGERY 175, 176 (2017).
165. Harris v. Groth, 663 P.2d 113, 120 (Wash. 1983) (“Our holding today may be summarized
as follows. The standard of care against which a health care provider’s conduct is to be measured is that
of a reasonably prudent practitioner possessing the degree of skill, care, and learning possessed by other
members of the same profession in the state of Washington. The degree of care actually practiced by
members of the profession is only some evidence of what is reasonably prudent–it is not dispositive.”).
166. Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law at the
Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 164 (2000).
167. Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 982 (Wash. 1974); O’Connor, supra note 105, at 123–25.
168. Helling, 519 P.2d at 985.
169. See generally The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662 (1932); Helling,
519 P.2d 981.
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individual providers which would be tailored to their excessive treatments.170 But
claims that Medicare has been wrongly billed are almost always accompanied by
claims of common law fraud, payment by mistake, and unjust enrichment, each of
which the Department of Justice (which represents Medicare in wrongful payment
cases) must and does bring as an advocate aiming for the best chance for recovery
for its client. Given that a court may give Medicare effectively the same
remedy—the amount it was overcharged—through a contract claim determined by
a jury, it is likely that the fiduciary duty claim Buck proposes, which would require
court-managed disgorgement or a constructive trust, would be disfavored, despite
its compelling and urgent rationale.
Similarly, Evan Criddle’s recommendation for Congress to amend the
Administrative Procedures Act to incorporate fiduciary principles of
purposefulness, integrity, solicitude, fairness, reasonableness, and transparency, and
to expand judicial review over some aspects of their implementation, may not lead
to more faithful behavior. In a careful and methodical analysis, Criddle advocates
loosening (1) the doctrine of nonreviewability, which limits the types of claims that
may be raised against agency inaction, and (2) the doctrine of standing, which limits
the types of parties who may bring claims based on agency inaction.171 He also
advocates inclusion of White House communications as part of the reviewable
record judges may consider.172 But as Criddle himself acknowledges, his proposals
multiply the grounds upon which courts may reach “arbitrary and capricious”
conclusions.173 As David Zaring has persuasively argued about judicial review of
agency action generally, “courts do not, in the end, discern the differences among
these various [agency review] doctrines, frequently do not distinguish among the
doctrines in application, and probably do not really care which standard of review
they apply most of the time.”174
Ethan Leib advocates the adoption of principles to guide a judicial finding of
“friendship” with accompanying rules as to the screening of minor conflicts,
threshold presumptions, and limitations on remedies like disgorgement.175 Yet as
with fiduciary duties for Medicare providers and agency rule-makers, the hope that
expansion of judicial review will strengthen rather than weaken the fiduciary duties
is in doubt. Indeed, Leib’s argument focuses on friendships that involve routine
legal disputes over business opportunities, gifts, and property. Remedies for
breaches of fiduciary duty are often equitable—by their nature judges seek to avoid
applying them if adequate alternative legal remedies exist.176
170. Buck, supra note 1, at 1074–75.
171. Criddle, supra note 1, at 483.
172. Id. at 484–85.
173. Id. at 486.
174. David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 138 (2010).
175. Leib, supra note 1.
176. DOUG RENDLEMAN & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, REMEDIES: CASES & MATERIALS 346 (8th
ed. 2011) (“There is constant pressure to utilize the remedies test for the parties’ right to a jury trial.
That test is more practical and easier to apply.”); E. Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss or My Gain? The
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IV. STATE AND FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES TO CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST
As detailed above, much of the literature on expanding fiduciary obligations
depends on utopian accounts of fiduciary heroes whose conduct is monitored by
equally utopian judges.177 But in actual operation, the fiduciary construct is not only
costly, it may overemphasize the conduct of the fiduciary actor and underemphasize
the context in which a purported breach occurs. In other words, instead of blaming
a fiduciary for a conflict of interest, it may be more efficient to target the source of
the conflict. The practice of medicine, like the practice of law, or the management
of a corporation, as well as parenthood and friendship, occurs in a complex social
marketplace.178 Studying the resource constraints that physicians face in modern
practice, the AMA contextualized the physician’s fiduciary duty:
Physicians’ primary ethical obligation is to promote the well-being of
individual patients. Physicians also have a long-recognized obligation to
patients in general to promote public health and access to care. This
obligation requires physicians to be prudent stewards of the shared societal
resources with which they are entrusted. Managing health care resources
responsibly for the benefit of all patients is compatible with physicians’
primary obligation to serve the interests of individual
patients . . . . Arguments that physicians should never allow considerations
other than the welfare of the patient before them to influence their
professional recommendations and treatment do not mesh with the reality
of clinical practice. Physicians regularly work with a variety of limits on
care: clinical practice guidelines, patient preferences, availability of certain
services, the benefits covered by a patient’s insurance plan, and the time
physicians and nurses can spend caring for a patient all influence what
interventions physicians recommend and what care they provide.179
Given the complex universe in which fiduciary duties are actually applied,
broadly worded and executed duties are less, not more, likely to lead to clear
expectations by fiduciaries or entrustors.

Dilemma of the Disgorgement Principle in Breach of Contract, 94 YALE L.J. 1339, 1368 (1985); James
Steven Rogers, Restitution for Wrongs and the Restatement (Third) of the Law of Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 55, 85–86 (2007); Doug Rendleman, Measurement of
Restitution: Coordinating Restitution with Compensatory Damages and Punitive Damages, 68 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 973 (2011).
177. Todd E. Pettys, The Myth of the Written Constitution, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 991, 1039
(2009) (“By obscuring judges’ physicality . . . robes promote the public’s image of judges as a select class
of people blessed with an almost superhuman capacity to deduce case-specific answers from the
nation’s fundamental legal precepts.”).
178. F. Patrick Maloney, The Industrialization of Medicine, 24 PHYSICIAN EXEC. 34 (1998);
Joanne Reeve, Tom Blakeman, George K. Freeman, Larry A. Green, Paul A. James, Peter Lucassen,
Carmel M. Martin, Joachim P. Sturmberg & Chris van Weel, Generalist Solutions to Complex
Problems: Generating Practice-Based Evidence - The Example of Managing Multi-Morbidity, 14 BMC
FAM. PRAC. 112 (2013).
179. DOUGLAS, supra note 14, at 2, 5.
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Physician conflicts of interest in federal and state law demonstrate how little
was obtained through judicially enforced fiduciary duties.180 Rather, the costs of
healthcare, the financial integrity of publicly funded healthcare systems, and the
statutory and regulatory targeting of sources of conflicts of interest—pharmaceutical
firms, self-referrals, device manufacturers—allowed legislators to shape the practice
of medicine in ways that achieved most if not all of the aims of fiduciary duties
without the structural and resource barriers courts face.
A. Prohibited Conflicts of Interest
The core fiduciary obligation—that of loyalty—generally admonishes
fiduciaries to put the interests of their entrustors above their own. The duty to avoid
conflicts of interest is then another aspect of the physician’s fiduciary duties, such
as avoiding conflicts “between their commitment to heal patients and their
economic self-interest.”181 Rodwin has defined conflict of interest as “[a]nything
that compromises the fiduciary’s loyalty to the fiducie or the fiduciary’s exercise of
independent judgment on the fiducie’s behalf,” and has identified two main kinds
of conflicts: “(1) conflicts stemming from financial and other personal interests; and
(2) conflicts stemming from divided loyalties of an actor performing
competing roles.”182
However, if a conflict does arise, that does not automatically disqualify the
fiduciary from acting in his or her role.183 Under this principle, fiduciaries are not
necessarily prohibited from entering into transactions that are or appear conflicted;
in many cases, they may still take advantage of opportunities as long as they disclose
their interest to their entrustors.184 Robertson, Rose, and Kesselheim write that
there “are reasons to doubt whether conflicts of interest impact the behaviors of
physicians” because of professional codes of conduct and the norms of
evidence-based medicine.185 In the corporate context, directors may, by way of

180. See supra Section III and accompanying footnotes.
181. Karine Morin, Herbert Rakatansky, Frank A. Riddick, Jr., Leonard J. Morse, John
M. O’Bannnon III, Michael S. Goldrich, Priscilla Ray, Matthew Weiss, Robert M. Sade & Monique
A. Spillman, Managing Conflicts of Interest in the Conduct of Clinical Trials, 287 JAMA 78, 80 (2002).
182. Rodwin, supra note 95, at 244.
183. Boyd, supra 63, at 137; see also Incentives to Physicians: Wise Policy or Risky Temptation?,
RELIAS MEDIA (Nov. 1, 2004), https://www.reliasmedia.com/articles/8327-incentives-to-physicianswise-policy-or-risky-temptation [ https://perma.cc/XSU3-3FDW] (“Under no circumstances may
physicians place their own financial interests above the welfare of their patients . . . . If a conflict
develops between the physician’s financial interest and the physician’s responsibilities to the patient,
the conflict must be resolved to the patient’s benefit.” (citations omitted)).
184. Claire Hill & Richard Painter, Compromised Fiduciaries: Conflicts of Interest in Government
and Business, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1637, 1643 (2011); Wulf A. Kaal & Richard W. Painter, Initial Reflections
on an Evolving Standard: Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in Germany and the United
States, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1433, 1452–53 (2010).
185. Robertson et al., supra note 77, at 452.
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comparison, take advantage of opportunities that might belong to the corporation
after proper disclosure and approval by other directors.186
Physicians operate under similar fiduciary obligations. A prescribed drug or
therapy may be provided by a firm that has paid a physician to speak or consult or
might be delivered in a facility in which the physician has a financial stake.187 In
some circumstances, disclosure may provide an adequate safeguard for the patient’s
interests.188 In others, the transaction may pose such a significant risk to patient
welfare that that they are prohibited entirely.189 As detailed above, courts enforcing
physicians’ fiduciary duties with respect to these conflicts tended to conflate duties
of loyalty and candor with routine medical malpractice actions. Fiduciary duties
themselves played a negligible role in patient protection. As Marc Rodwin famously
quipped, “although doctors perform fiduciary-like roles and hold themselves out as
fiduciaries in their ethical codes, the law holds doctors accountable as fiduciaries
only in restricted situations.”190
State and federal legislators, on the other hand, have regulated physician
conflicts of interest in multifaceted and nuanced ways. Under some regulatory
schemes, physicians are regulated directly—they are prohibited from entering into
certain transactions that pose risks for patient primacy, allowed to enter into those
transactions if they meet constraining criteria, or mandated to disclose potential
conflicts.191 Under other regulatory schemes, it is the sources of financial
conflicts—pharmaceutical and medical device firms, for example—that are

186. See generally MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.60–.63, 8.70 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010); FRANKLIN
A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 382–407 (2d ed. 2010).
187. Moe Litman, Self-Referral and Kickbacks: Fiduciary Law and the Regulation of Trafficking
in Patients, 170 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N J. 1119 (2004); Sujit Choudhry, Niteesh K. Choudhry
& Adalsteinn D. Brown, Unregulated Private Markets for Health Care in Canada? Rules of Professional
Misconduct, Physician Kickbacks and Physician Self-referral, 170 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N J. 1115, 1115
(2004) (“The term kickback refers to the financial compensation of physicians for patient referrals.
Compensation can flow from IHFs to referring physicians, or from specialists to primary care
physicians (fee-splitting). Compensation can consist of cash payments for each referral, discounted
office space or leases for medical equipment, or business loans at below-market rates. Compensation
for referrals is unobjectionable in most markets, but is problematic in health care in view of the potential
conflict between physicians’ financial self-interest and their duty to advise patients solely on the basis
of health needs.”).
188. Robert Steinbrook, Online Disclosure of Physician-Industry Relationships, 360 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 325, 325–27 (2009).
189. MARC A. RODWIN, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND THE FUTURE OF MEDICINE: THE
UNITED STATES, FRANCE, AND JAPAN 209 (2011).
190. Rodwin, supra note 95, at 242; Nan D. Hunter, Risk Governance and Deliberative Democracy
in Health Care, 97 GEO. L.J. 1, 23 n.109 (2008) (“Marc Rodwin has argued that the concept of doctors
as fiduciaries for their patients is ‘a dominant metaphor’ in health law, but that courts enforce it in only
limited circumstances.”).
191. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 456.054(2) (2020) (establishing that it is a violation of a state criminal
statute for a “health care provider” to “offer, pay, solicit, or receive a kickback, directly or indirectly,
overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind, for referring or soliciting patients”).

First to Printer_Halabi.docx (Do Not Delete)

2020]

AGAINST FIDUCIARY UTOPIANISM

11/30/20 11:15 AM

463

targeted.192 Below we detail legal and regulatory regimes that more effectively
address physician conflicts of interest.
1. Anti-Kickback Statutes
In 1972, Congress adopted the federal Anti-Kickback Statute, imposing
criminal penalties for exchanging (or offering to exchange) anything of value, in an
effort to induce (or reward) the referral of healthcare products or services
reimbursed by federal health programs like Medicaid and Medicare.193 The
Anti-Kickback Statute is broadly drafted and establishes penalties for individuals
and entities on both sides of prohibited transactions so that both physicians and
those who would attempt to induce them to prescribe drugs or treatment are
covered. The statute is also cognizant that medical practice occurs in a complex
environment so that certain types of payments are excluded from consideration by
statute.194 Congress further gave HHS the authority to create more safe harbors and
authorized the HHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) to issue binding advisory
opinions, which function like case-by-case safe harbors.195 Together, these safe
harbors protect specifically identified business and financial practices from criminal
and civil prosecution including space rental, equipment rental, personal services and
management contracts, health maintenance organizations, preferred provider
organizations, and sales of medical practices.196 Congress was explicit in its effort to
codify existing professional ethical canons regarding physician loyalty.197
The federal Anti-Kickback Statute encouraged states to adopt laws tailored for
medical practice within their jurisdiction. While Minnesota’s Anti-Kickback Statute
provides that its rules must be “compatible with, and no less restrictive than” the
federal Anti-Kickback Statute, New Mexico’s Anti-Kickback Statute reaches
192. See generally 42 C.F.R. §§ 402–403 (2019). The government has good reasons for doing so.
Healthcare-related fraud, almost all of which is white-collar crime or civil fraud, costs the government
billions of dollars. Mihailis E. Diamantis, White-Collar Showdown, 103 IOWA L. REV. ONLINE 320,
320–21 (2017) (“The FBI estimates that the annual cost of white-collar crime in the United States is
around half a trillion dollars, roughly thirty times the cost for every other crime combined.”).
193. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b.
194. Id. § 1320a-7b(b)(3).
195. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936, 2000–02.
196. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (2019); David A. Hyman, Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Market
Change, Social Norms, and the Trust “Reposed in the Workmen,” 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 531, 534–35 (2001).
197. The legislative report accompanying the enactment of the statute states that the purpose
of the statute was to:
[P]rovide penalties for certain practices which have long been regarded by professional
organizations as unethical, as well as unlawful in some jurisdictions, and which contribute
appreciably to the cost of the Medicare and Medicaid programs. Thus . . . the criminal
penalty provision would include such practices as the soliciting, offering or accepting of
kickbacks or bribes . . . involving providers of health care services.
H.R. REP. NO. 92-231, at 1 (1972), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4989, 5093. It was understood at
the time (and thereafter) that although the legislative history and the statute itself spoke in broader
terms, the overriding purpose of the statute was to “ensure that medical decisions are not influenced
by financial rewards from third parties.” H.R. REP. NO. 104-276, pt. 1, at 497 (1995).

First to Printer_Halabi.docx (Do Not Delete)

464

11/30/20 11:15 AM

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:433

further, “providing that any person who knowingly solicits, receives, offers, or pays
remuneration directly, indirectly, overtly, covertly, in return for referrals or
purchasing, leasing, ordering or arranging goods, facilities, or services for which
payment is made in whole or in part with public money shall be guilty of a felony.”198
“The state statute does not apply to properly disclosed discounts or to a bona fide
employee-employer relationship.”199 States have tailored their anti-kickback statutes
for the unique aspects of medical practice in their territories.200 For example, state
anti-kickback laws usually apply to all payers while the federal law applies only to
federal healthcare program payments.
2. Stark Laws
As more patients became Medicare eligible after 1965, Congress adopted the
Ethics in Patient Referral Act of 1989 (Stark Law), which prohibited physicians, or
their immediate family members, who had a financial relationship with the
providers of designated health services entities from referring Medicare patients to
those entities.201 Physicians with interests in companies that provided clinical
laboratory services, physical therapy services, occupational therapy services,
outpatient speech-language pathology services, radiology and certain other imaging
services, radiation therapy services and supplies, and durable medical equipment
and supplies were prohibited from referring patients to those companies.202 Revised
in 2008 and again under the Affordable Care Act, Stark “greatly limit[s] a physician’s
ability to hold financial interests in [providers that create conflicts of interest].”203
Financial interests under the law include ownership and investment interests, as well
as compensation arrangements.204
The Stark Law is not only tailored to specific services where physician
conflicts are common, but also makes physicians referring to conflicted entities
strictly liable.205 Disclosure may not cure the conflict (although it may reduce the
penalty) and it is irrelevant whether a physician intended to refer a patient for
198. Kathryn Leaman, State Anti-Kickback Statutes: Where the Action Is, 2 HEALTH L. & POL’Y
BRIEF 22, 23 (2008).
199. Id.
200. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
LAWS AGAINST HEALTH CARE FRAUD RESOURCE GUIDE (2014), http://www.healthsmartmso.com/
downloadfile/FWA/Care1stFWA/11%20-%20FWA-Law%20Against%20Health%20Care%20Fraud.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/4HZB-QNH2 ].
201. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., 114TH CONG., WHY STARK, WHY NOW? SUGGESTIONS TO
IMPROVE THE STARK LAW TO ENCOURAGE INNOVATIVE PAYMENTS MODELS 4 (2016), https://
www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Stark%20White%20Paper,%20SFC%20Majority%20Staff.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/RW4K-YWY8 ].
202. Physician Self-Referral, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://
www.cms.gov/Medicare/Fraud-and-Abuse/PhysicianSelfReferral/
[ https://perma.cc/EHE8V5CJ ] (Jan. 5, 2015, 5:59 AM).
203. Matt Frederiksen & Emily Egan Weaver, Understanding the Federal Physician Self-Referral
Statute: “Stark Law,” 17 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 47, 48 (2015).
204. 42 C.F.R. § 411.354 (2019).
205. Patrick A. Sutton, The Stark Law in Retrospect, 20 ANNALS HEALTH L. 15 (2011).
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financial gain or not.206 Congress’s purpose in enacting the Stark Law was to “limit
the influence of financial relationships on physician referrals.”207 Congress’s
intention was to create a “bright line rule, which would encourage hospitals and
other providers to self-police their arrangements with physicians.”208
As with the Anti-Kickback Statute, Congress gave HHS “the authority to
except certain relationships from the general referral prohibition.”209 With that
authority, HHS established through regulations exceptions to ensure that the
referral prohibition of the Stark Law “was not overly broad.”210 For example,
physicians may consult with one another about the best treatment options for a
patient and evade violation of the law as long as the “‘request and need for the
consultation are documented in the patient’s medical record . . . . After the
consultation is provided,’ the [referred physician] must prepare ‘a written report of
his or her findings, which is provided to the physician who requested the
consultation.’”211 The referred physician “must communicate ‘with the referring
physician on a regular basis about the patient’s course of treatment
and progress.’”212
Congress shaped judicial management of physician conflicts under Stark by
authorizing a burden shifting framework under which the physician would be
presumed to have violated the prohibition on self-referrals but could raise an
exception as an affirmative defense. Those exceptions include referrals within the
same group practice, office space, equipment, bona fide employment relationships,
and several exceptions for physician recruitment and compensation
arrangements.213 “[M]any of the exceptions require that the arrangement be (1) in
writing, (2) signed by the parties, (3) commercially reasonable without regard to
referrals, and (4) fair market value.”214 The Affordable Care Act also gave the HHS
the authority to “decrease the penalty of the Stark Law violation if the violation has
been self-disclosed.”215
As with the Anti-Kickback Statute, states have adopted their own versions of
self-referral prohibitions.216 Thirty-four states have laws regarding referrals by
healthcare providers to entities in which they have a financial interest (e.g., a

206. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., supra note 201, at 2, 5, 6.
207. Id. at 2.
208. Id. at 5.
209. Stacey A. Tovino, Gone Too Far: Federal Regulation of Health Care Attorneys, 91
OR. L. REV. 813, 863 (2013).
210. Id.
211. United States ex rel. Barker v. Tidwell, No. 4:12-CV-108 (CDL), 2015 WL 3505554, at *4
(M.D. Ga. June 3, 2015) (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 411.351 (2019)).
212. Id.
213. Rick Rifenbark, Paul A. Gomez, Travis Jackson & Ryan M. McAteer, What You Don’t
Know Can Hurt You: Best Practices and Key Legal Issues in Health Care Due Diligence, 19 J. HEALTH
CARE COMPLIANCE 15, 19 (2017).
214. Id.
215. Frederiksen & Weaver, supra note 203, at 64.
216. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 650.01–.02 (West 2020); OR. REV. STAT. § 441.098 (2020).
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physician referring a patient to a surgical center in which he or she is an investor).217
Some state laws mirror federal law. Others prohibit all self-referrals and ban
physicians from any ownership interest in hospitals or other facilities to which they
refer patients. Several simply require disclosure of financial interests to patients.
Most states also prohibit fee splitting or giving rebates for referrals, which might
also apply to some transactions between referral sources. For example, many states’
laws prohibit paying or accepting payment from others to refer claimants to
healthcare providers, or to provide services to a person knowing that the person has
been referred in exchange for payment of a fee.218
The rationale behind these state statutes “regarding a physician’s receiving
compensation for the referral of patients or the prescription of drugs is to protect
consumers from economic arrangements in the medical disciplines that will increase
the cost of health care, restrict the patient’s access to medical goods and services,
or otherwise harm patients as consumers.”219 Indeed, regulations of physician
referrals overlap with the physician’s duty of loyalty and candor to patients.220 State
legislatures have “accepted the rationale that patients should receive their medical
opinions about their own treatment, and about referrals to other physicians or
specialists, that are not the product of a conflict of interest on the part of the
referring physician.”221 These statutes all relate to the physician’s obligation to
provide patient care free from conflicts of interest and to fully inform patients about
the care they receive.222
3. Anti-Detailing Laws
In addition to Congress and state legislatures adopting measures to address
physician conflicts of interest including prohibitions, safe harbors, and disclosures,
state legislatures have also attempted to address specific sources of conflicts like
incentives extended by drug and device firms. Prescription drug marketing is a large
part of the success of the pharmaceutical industry, which grossed over $800 billion
in 2011.223 Eighty percent of marketing efforts to influence physicians are through
industry gifts and detailing, the activity of pharmaceutical sales representatives (reps)
when they make calls to physicians and provide them with “details”—scientific

217. ASTRO, STATE SELF-REFERRAL LAW CITATIONS, https://www.astro.org/
uploadedfiles/content/advocacy/state%20self-referral%20laws.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/N249EWKU ] ( last visited Nov. 7, 2020 ).
218. IDAHO CODE § 41-348 (2020); FLA. STAT. § 456.054 (2020).
219. 61 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 245 § 8 (2018).
220. Compare Julie E. Kass & John S. Linehan, Fostering Healthcare Reform Through a Bifurcated
Model of Fraud and Abuse Regulation, 5 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCIS. L. 75, 97 (2012), with Greg Radinsky,
Defining a Group Practice: An Analysis of the Stark I Final Rule, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1119, 1122 (1997).
221. 61 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D, supra note 219.
222. Id.
223. Melissa N. Hoffman, Pharmaceutical Detailing Is Not for Everyone: Side Effects May Include
Sub-Optimal Prescribing Decisions, Compromised Patient Health, and Increased Prescription Drug Spending,
33 J. LEGAL MED. 381, 382 (2012).
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information, benefits, side effects, or adverse events—related to a drug.224 Detailing
activity includes both innocuous gifts like free samples for patients as well as
inducements for physicians themselves.
Detailing is partnered with data mining—understanding how and why
physicians prescribe the drugs they do then adopting a range of tactics to encourage
them to prescribe more of a certain, inevitably more expensive, drug.225 Data mining
involves large third-party firms that assemble information about physicians’
prescribing practices and sell it to drug companies for marketing and sales
purposes.226 The data gathered includes the physician’s name and address; the
patient’s gender and age; the name, dosage and quantity of the medication; and the
date and location where the prescription was filled.227
Detailing is a “massive and expensive” venture for pharmaceutical
manufacturers, with the sole purpose of marketing brand-name drugs.228 “On
average, 28 detailers visit a single prescriber in a week, and 14 detailers contact a
single specialist each week.”229 Firms spend an average of $8,290 per physician.230
Studies have shown visiting physicians increases drugs sales, and even small gifts or
free samples have been shown to have an effect.231 Pharmaceutical manufacturers
provide more than $15 billion worth of free samples to ninety percent
of U.S. physicians each year.232
The adverse effects on physicians and patients are well established. Physicians’
prescribing behavior may be compromised. Detailers try to promote their drug for
use in the widest population of patients without any thought to the specific patient
at the moment’s well-being.233 “If they see that I’m prescribing more of Drug X
than their Drug Y, they might show me their data that points to the problems of

224. David Grande, Limiting the Influence of Pharmaceutical Industry Gifts on
Physicians: Self-Regulation or Government Intervention?, 25 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 79, 79 (2009).
225. Hoffman, supra note 223.
226. JOHN KASPRAK, FEDERAL APPELLATE COURT DECISION –– NEW HAMPSHIRE
PRESCRIPTION DRUG INFORMATION LAW (2008), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2008/rpt/2008-r0680.htm [ https://perma.cc/AKD3-G76Y ].
227. Hoffman, supra note 223.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 383.
231. Richard Saver, Deciphering the Sunshine Act: Transparency Regulation and Financial Conflicts
in Health Care, 43 AM. J.L. & MED. 303, 315 (2017).
232. Hoffman, supra note 223, at 389.
233. See id. at 341.
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Drug X.”234 The patient may receive care affected by detailers’ representations,
rather than individual needs, potentially causing adverse outcomes.235
As early as 1991, the AMA issued ethical guidelines that allowed gifts less than
$100, if they primarily entailed a benefit to patients.236 The Pharmaceutical Research
and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), the industry’s main lobby, followed with
voluntary guidelines, similar to AMA’s, to declare its commitment “to ensure their
medicines are marketed in a manner that benefits patients and enhances the practice
of medicine.”237 The AMA also created the Physician Data Restriction Program
(PDRP) allowing physicians to protect their individual prescribing data from
detailers while still being available for medical research.238
Several states, encouraged by their physicians, viewed pharmaceutical detailing
as a threat to the integrity of their practices and to patient welfare. In 2006, New
Hampshire adopted the Prescription Information Confidentiality Act which
declared that prescription information shall not be “used, transferred, licensed, or
sold for any commercial purpose except for limited purposes.”239 Specifically, it
served to safeguard the privacy of both patients and physicians by preventing the
sale of prescription information for use by pharmacies and drug companies to
promote specific medications or monitor sales.240 The Prescription Information
Confidentiality Act was carefully drafted to not interfere with legitimate use of
identifiable data (e.g., utilization review, compliance, academic research, or
insurance company reimbursement to pharmacies).241
Vermont adopted a similar measure in an effort to promote “physician
confidentiality, avoidance of harassment, and the integrity of the doctor-patient
relationship.”242 Vermont had three objectives with this law: (1) avoiding harm to

234. Hearing on H.B. 1346 Before the House Comm. on Exec. Dep’ts & Admin., 159th Gen. Ct.,
2006 Sess. (N.H. 2006) (statement of Dr. Marc Sadowsky, President of N.H. Medical Soc’y); see also
Memorandum or Amicus Curiae Coalition for Healthcare Communications in Support of Plaintiff’s
Prayer for Permanent Injunction at 16, IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008)
(No. 06-280-PB) (citing and quoting Dr. Sadowsky’s testimony on H.B. 1346).
235. Hoffman, supra note 223, at 386; Tamara R. Piety, “A Necessary Cost of Freedom”? The
Incoherence of Sorrell v. IMS, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1, 11 (2012).
236. See Hoffman, supra note 223, at 388; see also AM. MED. ASS’N, Chapter 9: Ethics of
Professional Self-Regulation, in CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 67, at Op. 9.6.2.
237.
Grande, supra note 224, at 79; see also AM. MED. ASS’N, Chapter 9: Ethics of Professional
Self-Regulation, in CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 67, at Op. 9.6.2; PhRMA, CODE ON
INTERACTIONS WITH HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS (2009), https://www.phrma.org/-/media/
Project/PhRMA/PhRMA-Org/PhRMA-Org/PDF/A-C/Code-of-Interaction_FINAL21.pdf [ https://
perma.cc/WJ4N-9ZSX ].
238. Hoffman, supra note 223, at 391; see also Douglas S. Kaplan & Wayne H. Fujita,
Am. Med. Ass’n, Physicians Discuss Use of Prescribing Data, 105 W. VA. MED. J. 52 (2011).
239. N.H. REV. STAT. § 318:47(f) (2006).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 572 (2011); see S. 115, 2007–2008 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2008).
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public health, (2) controlling costs, and (3) protecting physician’s privacy.243 The law
aimed to give physicians control over how information about prescribing practices
could be used with respect to marketing through its “opt-in” provision.244
Vermont’s law barred the use of data unless a physician “opts-in.”245
Third-party data miners brought suit against both laws, arguing that they
represented viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment.246 The
First Circuit upheld New Hampshire’s law while the Second Circuit invalidated
Vermont’s.247 The Second Circuit determined that Vermont’s law constituted an
“unconstitutional regulation of commercial speech.”248 In 2011, Vermont appealed
to the United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.249 In a 6-3 vote, the
Court held in IMS v. Sorrell that a statute prohibiting the sale of
prescriber-identifying information is unconstitutional under the First
Amendment.250 The Supreme Court was relatively indifferent to the fiduciary
relationship between physicians and patients adversely affected by the measures
adopted by New Hampshire and Vermont. In the Court’s view, the damage to the
relationship was a “necessary cost of freedom” for the data miners.251
B. Candor and Disclosure
While anti-detailing laws failed, states achieved greater success using
mechanisms of transparency to reveal industry tactics that created conflicts of
interest for physicians.252 State legislatures led in the regulation of the content of
243. Michelle M. Mello & Noah A. Messing, Restrictions on the Use of Prescribing Data for Drug
Promotion, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1248, 1248 (2011).
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 1249; see IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 631 F. Supp. 2d 434 (D. Vt. 2009), rev’d, 630 F.3d
263 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d. 564 U.S. 552; IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008), cert. denied,
557 U.S. 936 (2009), and abrogated by Sorrell, 564 U.S. 552; IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 490 F. Supp. 2d
163 (D.N.H. 2007) (holding the statute was subject to the First Amendment, prescription information
was commercial speech, and the statute did not advance the state’s interest in promoting public health),
rev’d in part and vacated in part, 550 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008); see also Kasprak, supra note 226.
247. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42; see also Stephanie Saul, Federal Court Upholds Drug Privacy Law,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/19/business/19drug.html
[ https://perma.cc/U8VC-MD9Z ].
248. Sorrell, 630 F.3d at 282; see Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447
U.S. 557, 564 (1980) (providing that the test requires the government show that regulations restricting
commercial speech meet two requirements: (1) the regulation serves a substantial state interest, and (2)
the governmental interest could not be adequately served by a more limited expression on the
commercial speech).
249. Sorrell, 564 U.S. 552; see also Robert Corn-Revere & Ronald G. London, Supreme Court
Invalidates Vermont Law Limiting Data Mining for Pharmaceutical “Detailing,” DAVIS
WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP
(June 23, 2011), https://www.dwt.com/advisories/Supreme_Court_
Invalidates_Vermont_Law_Limiting_Data_Mining_for_Pharmaceutical_Detailing_06_23_2011/
[ https://perma.cc/3EG2-HDNA ].
250. Corn-Revere & Ronald G. London, supra note 249.
251. Piety, supra note 235, at 1.
252. JENNIFER STAMAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R40790, REQUIRING DISCLOSURE OF GIFTS
AND PAYMENTS TO HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS: A LEGAL OVERVIEW 1 (2009).
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physician disclosures to patients, although Congress followed with the Physician
Payments Sunshine Act in 2010.
1. Conflicts of Interest
Before the Physician Payments Sunshine Act was adopted as part of the
Affordable Care Act in 2010, California, the District of Columbia, Maine,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Vermont, and West Virginia had adopted laws requiring
disclosure of pharmaceutical firm and medical device companies’ payments to
physicians for a range of activities including consulting, speaking, and leading
continuing medical education seminars, in addition to outright gifts.253
Dr. Peter Lurie, deputy director of Public Citizen’s Health Research Group,
outlined the effects of these practices:
Physicians typically claim that they are unaffected by such interactions
(although they are willing to acknowledge that their colleagues might be
influenced). But pharmaceutical companies would not be catering to the
culinary and travel preferences of physicians if they thought their efforts
were for nought. The evidence strongly suggests that the companies are
right. For instance, contact with pharmaceutical company representatives
is associated with changes in the prescribing practices of residents and
physicians and more rapid adoption of new drugs by prescribers.
Sponsorship of continuing medical education programs by a
pharmaceutical company and all-expenses-paid travel to conferences are
associated with increases in the prescribing rate of the sponsors’ drugs.
Finally, interactions with a pharmaceutical company representative are
associated with an increased likelihood of requesting that the
representative’s company’s drug be added to the hospital formulary. Thus,
as companies with a clear conflict of interest in promoting a specific
product continue to influence physicians, the result can be prescribing
based on marketing, rather than science.254
A report from the Institute of Medicine found that the drug company practice
of giving doctors gifts and meals, along with other financial incentives, may
influence physicians to prescribe a specific drug when another drug might be more
beneficial to the patient.255 The American Medical Association acknowledged these

253. Joseph S. Ross, Josh E. Lackner, Peter Lurie, Cary P. Gross, Sidney Wolfe & Harlan
M. Krumholz, Pharmaceutical Company Payments to Physicians: Early Experiences with Disclosure Laws
in Vermont and Minnesota, 297 JAMA 1216, 1216–17 (2007).
254. Paid to Prescribe? Exploring the Relationship Between Doctors and the Drug Industry: Hearing
Before the Special S. Comm. on Aging, 110th Cong. 23–24 (2007) (statement of Dr. Peter Lurie, Deputy
Director, Public Citizen’s Health Research Group).
255. Chris Hendel, Vermont Passes Sunshine Law Limiting Drug Company Gifts to Doctors,
CONSUMER REPS. (June 10, 2009, 5:11 PM), https://www.consumerreports.org/cro/news/2009/06/
vermont-passes-sunshine-law-limiting-drug-company-gifts-to-doctors/index.htm [ https://perma.cc/
B26U-P37Q ].
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risks to the duties physicians owed to patients.256 The AMA advised physicians that
only small gifts and “modest meals” might be allowed and, even then, must “entail
a benefit to patients,” not be “of substantial value,” or must “serve a genuine
educational function” to be permitted.257 Even those small promotional items,
however, had been shown to affect physician behavior.258
a. State Disclosure Laws
In 1993, Minnesota adopted the country’s first physician payment sunshine
law.259 It not only banned gifts to practitioners, it required that firms report
payments and other compensation paid to practitioners under the law.260 In 2004,
California introduced SB 1765 “to place limits on promotional gifts pharmaceutical
companies may give to physicians and other health care professionals that are
consistent with established guidelines,” out of concern that the gifts were affecting
“both the utilization and types of drugs prescribed.”261 The bill was specifically
aimed at easing public concerns about conflicts of interest between doctors and
drug company sales representatives.262 The bill required pharmaceutical companies
to comply with PhRMA and OIG guidelines, set limits on giving gifts to medical or
healthcare professionals, except for drug samples, educational materials, and related
materials, and mandated that the companies develop and maintain a policy that
complies with these guidelines.263 Lawmakers noted the ineffectiveness of voluntary
guidelines on their own as too “permissive” and “a number of troublesome
practices became commonplace after the guidelines were adopted.”264 The
legislation attempted to remedy the situation by enforcing the guidelines on a
governmental level, where failure to comply could result in civil enforcement action
or prosecutors could “file complaints seeking injunctive relief and restitution” and
“could also seek civil penalties.”265

256. Marketing and Advertising of Pharmaceuticals, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES
(Nov. 5, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/marketing-and-advertising-of-pharmaceuticals.aspx
[ https://perma.cc/95RA-R58N ]; AM. MED. ASS’N, Chapter 8: Ethics for Physicians & the Health of the
Community, in CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 67, at Op. 8.061.
257. AM. MED. ASS’N, Chapter 9: Ethics of Professional Self-Regulation, in CODE OF MEDICAL
ETHICS, supra note 67, at Op. 9.6.2.
258. David Grande, Dominick L. Frosch, Andrew W. Perkins & Barbara E. Kahn, Effect of
Exposure to Small Pharmaceutical Promotional Items on Treatment Preferences, 169 ARCHIVES INTERNAL
MED. 887 (2009), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamainternalmedicine/fullarticle/773513
[ https://perma.cc/7G65-LX6H ].
259. MINN. STAT. § 151.461 (2020); id. § 151.252, subdiv. 3 (2019).
260. § 151.252, subdiv. 3.
261. S. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. COMM., BILL ANALYSIS, S. 1765, 2003–2004 Leg., Reg. Sess.,
at 4 (Cal. 2004).
262. Id. at 3.
263. Id. at 1.
264. Id. at 3–4.
265. Id. at 7.
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Even after SB 1765, California physicians and medical professionals led the
nation in the number of gifts taken, over $1.4 billion in 2014.266 SB 790, an update
to the law, aims to curb financial payments, gifts, and incentives to physicians.
Massachusetts adopted a similar strategy through its Pharmaceutical and Medical
Device Manufacturer Code of Conduct, which incorporated the requirements from
two medical trade associations’ codes, PhRMA and AdvaMed; however, the state’s
code also included several of its own requirements and prohibitions that were not
later preempted by federal Physician Payments Sunshine Act.267
Vermont adopted one of the first laws requiring payment disclosure from the
medical industry to physicians and research hospitals or universities.268 The state’s
law revealed that “[t]he median payment [to a physician] was $177, and the largest
payment was $20,000. Sixty-eight percent of these payments were in the form of
food, which clearly provides no patient benefit and, therefore, in our view, is likely
to violate the AMA and the PhRMA guidelines.”269
After adoption of the federal Physician Payments Sunshine Act as part of the
Affordable Care Act, detailed below, many states have adopted laws that extend
disclosure requirements to medical providers not covered like physician assistants
and nurse practitioners.270
b. The Federal Physician Payments Sunshine Act
Well after Minnesota’s 1993 law, but in parallel with state efforts, Congress
explored legislative efforts at requiring disclosure of payments by firms to
physicians.271 The federal Physician Payments Sunshine Act was first introduced as
a stand-alone bill by Senators Charles “Chuck” Grassley and Herbert “Herb” Kohl
in 2007.272 After it initially failed to pass, the bill was included in an amended form
in the Affordable Care Act as section 6002.273 The Act requires that all
manufacturers of drugs or medical devices that are covered by Medicare, Medicaid,
or Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) report “[p]ayments [and] transfers

266. Geneva Peppars, Senate Passes Bill Restricting Gifts from Pharma Companies to Doctors,
KRCR (May 18, 2017), https://krcrtv.com/archive/senate-passes-bill-restricting-gifts-from-pharmacompanies-to-doctors [ https://web.archive.org/web/20201009022516/https://krcrtv.com/archive/
senate-passes-bill-restricting-gifts-from-pharma-companies-to-doctors ].
267. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111N, § 6(1) (2012).
268. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4632 (2019).
269. Paid to Prescribe? Exploring the Relationship Between Doctors and the Drug Industry: Hearing
Before the Special S. Comm. on Aging, supra note 254, at 23–24.
270. Meena Datta, States May Be Moving to Expand the Federal Sunshine Law, LAW 360 ( July
11, 2014, 10:42 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/550642/print?section=california
[ https://perma.cc/AY2K-WY3J ].
271. Elizabeth Richardson, Health Policy Brief: The Physician Payment Sunshine Act, HEALTH
AFFS. (Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief_id=127
[ https://perma.cc/6Q3N-J6TM ]; see also Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-148, sec. 6002, § 1128G(a)(1)(A), 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
272. See Richardson, supra note 271, at 2.
273. Id.
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of value” made to physicians or teaching hospitals that are $100 or more.274 Drug
samples that are not meant for sale and are distributed to physicians for patients to
use are excepted from reporting.275 In addition, the Act does not require that the
doctors or hospitals themselves report such information, but it does permit them
to contest the data should they feel it is inaccurate.276 All reports must be made in a
timely manner and must be reported in full or risk fines up to $1,000,000.277
The Act lists both the types of recipients the companies must report, as well
as what types of transfers that must be reported. It requires that those gifts be
reported, along with any other “transfer of value,” which includes “honoraria,
consulting fees, food, travel, education, research, charitable contribution,” as well
as investments doctors make in the companies, such as stocks or shares.278 The
Secretary of Health and Human Services aggregates and posts that information on
a website available to the public.279 Patients may search the site to see if their
physicians or hospitals have received transfers of value and in what amount.280
The Act is aimed at protecting the patient’s right to be informed about their
healthcare. Conflicts of interest preoccupied Congress in the years leading to
adoption of the Sunshine Act. Senator Grassley, long concerned about integrity in
various sectors of the healthcare system, became concerned with the relationship
between doctors and the pharmaceutical industry after learning that medical
research was being conducted that was funded by pharmaceutical companies that
manufactured the drugs being researched.281 Grassley investigated industry activities
in the research process and discovered a significant lack of disclosure about industry
ties.282 Contemporaneously, the New York Times reported in a series of articles that
the largest pharmaceutical companies were paying hundreds of millions of dollars
through rebates to doctors across the nation every year in return for them
prescribing certain classes of medications instead of their competitors’ versions.283
By giving the doctors rebates for the amount of drugs they prescribed, the doctors
were incentivized to prescribe more expensive drugs in higher doses, sometimes to

274. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1128G(d)(1)(B)(i).
275. Id. at § 1128G(d)(1)(B)(ii).
276. Id. at § 1128G(c)(1)(C)(ix).
277. Id. at § 1128G(b)(2).
278. Id. at § 1128G(a)(1) (A)(iv).
279. Id. at § 1128G(c)(1)(C).
280. Id. at § 1128G(d)(3)(A), (B).
281. Let the Sunshine In: Implementing the Physician Payments Sunshine Act: Roundtable Before
the Special S. Comm. on Aging, 112th Cong 1, 2 (2012) (statement of Sen. Charles Grassley).
282. Grassley Q & A: Disclosing Drug Industry Dollars to Doctors, CHUCK GRASSLEY (Sept. 10,
2011),
https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-q-disclosing-drug-industrydollars-doctors [ https://perma.cc/QK8V-G6V8 ].
283. Alex Berenson & Andrew Pollack, Doctors Reap Millions for Anemia Drugs, N.Y. TIMES
(May 9, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/09/business/09anemia.html [ https://
perma.cc/L69F-962Z ]; Gardiner Harris & Janet Roberts, Doctors’ Ties to Drug Makers Are Put on Close
View, N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 21, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/21/us/21drug.html
[ https://perma.cc/NHC8-C6DT ].
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unsafe levels.284 After the Act failed to pass on its own in 2008, it was reintroduced
by Grassley and Kohl in 2009 as a part of the Affordable Care Act, which passed
in 2010.285
The disclosure regime is structured so as to require firms to report payments,
instead of imposing burdens on physicians. Indeed, the information required to be
disclosed was already being collected by drug and device firms.286 The law is
therefore a less burdensome way to get at a source of physician conflicts of interest
than a duty-of-loyalty inquiry undertaken by a court.
c. System Effects of Federal and State Sunshine Laws
Transparency laws have not only benefited patients, who now have access to
information on sources of payments to physicians, but also law enforcement
ensuring the healthcare sector’s financial integrity.287 The database is cautious in its
communications to patients. Shantanu Agrawal, the former deputy administrator
for the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), stated that the
government would not “draw conclusions about the disclosed payments,” and
“cautioned” the public not to do so either because “[f]inancial ties and relationships
between medical manufacturers and health care providers do not necessarily signal
wrongdoing.”288 In addition, the “Open Payments program does not identify which
financial relationships are beneficial and which could cause conflicts of interest.”289
Patients themselves are allowed to draw their own conclusions.290 In one study
conducted in the medical research context, this comports with patient

284. Berenson & Pollack, supra note 283; 153 CONG. REC. S11,215, S11,217–18 (daily
ed. Sept. 6, 2007) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
285. Paid to Prescribe? Exploring the Relationship Between Doctors and the Drug Industry: Hearing
Before the Special S. Comm. on Aging, supra note 254, at 1 (statement of Sen. Herbert Kohl, Chairman
of the Comm.).
286. Press Release, Chuck Grassley, U.S. Sen., Grassley, Kohl Say Public Should Know When
Pharmaceutical Makers Give Money to Doctors (Sept. 6, 2007), https://www.grassley.senate.gov/
news/news-releases/grassley-kohl-say-public-should-know-when-pharmaceutical-makers-give-money
[ https://perma.cc/U3EW-NW5R ].
287. James Rickert, If Obamacare Is Dismantled, Keep the Sunshine Act to Illuminate Physician
Conflict of Interest, STAT ( Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.statnews.com/2017/01/25/sunshine-actphysicians-conflict-of-interest/ [ https://perma.cc/7QZR-H8ZL ].
288. Peter Frost, Alex Richards, Cynthia Dizikes & Ellen Jean Hirst, Obamacare Sunshine Act
Sheds Light on $3.5B Paid to Doctors, CHI TRIB. (Oct. 1, 2014, 2:00 AM), http://
www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-sunshine-act-1001-biz-20141001-story.html
[ https://
perma.cc/3K7T-ND7G ].
289. Robert Lowes, Open Payments Data Release Has Big Gaps, MEDSCAPE (Sept. 30, 2014),
https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/832614 [ https://perma.cc/QGV5-RBRB ]; Jeanne Whalen,
Joseph Walker & Jonathan D. Rockoff, Payments Reveal Range of Doctors’ Ties with Industry, WALL
ST. J. (Oct. 1, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/payments-show-range-of-doctors-ties-withindustry-1412208328 [ https://perma.cc/4DG4-S2DN ].
290. See Open Payments Data in Context, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://
www.cms.gov/OpenPayments/About/Open-Payments-Data-in-Context.html
[ https://perma.cc/
A2WG-YZWF ] (Nov. 1, 2019, 8:25 AM).
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interests—they want to know about potential conflicts, even if it might not
ultimately change their mind about seeing a particular physician.291
Not only patients, but governmental entities also use the data for purposes of
ensuring the integrity of the quality and financing of the health system. The
information has been used to help investigate providers and firms for violating
anti-kickback statutes.292 Disclosure supports “enforcement of the healthcare fraud
and abuse laws by identifying financial relationships that may warrant further
scrutiny for association with problematic referrals or false claims.”293 In 2017, the
HHS Office of the Inspector General specified that it would “analyze 2015 data
extracted from the Open Payments website” for purposes of
commencing investigations.294
In a class action suit filed against Insys Therapeutics, Inc. in 2014, four months
after the release of the first Open Payments data, the plaintiffs used Insys’s own
data against them.295 The plaintiffs alleged that the payments the company made to
physicians who promoted the company’s drug Subsys through speeches “essentially
were kickbacks to induce prescriptions.”296 The case was settled in 2015 for $6.1
million, but the same data was used to launch investigations of improper financial
incentives by authorities in Oregon, Massachusetts, and four other states, as well as
the HHS Office of Inspector General.297 On May 14, 2018, the U.S. government
officially intervened as a plaintiff.298
Since the adoption of the Act, physicians, hospitals, and healthcare systems
have altered their relationship with pharmaceutical representatives by either limiting
their interactions with them or completely denying them access to their offices.299

291. Christine Grady, Elizabeth Horstmann, Jeffrey S. Sussman & Sara Chandros Hull, The
Limits of Disclosure: What Research Subjects Want to Know About Investigator Financial Interests, 34
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 592, 594, 596–97 (2006).
292. Richard S. Saver, Shadows amid Sunshine: Regulating Financial Conflicts in Medical Research,
145 CHEST 379, 383 (2014).
293. Id.
294. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OIG WORK PLAN
16 (2017), https://oig.hhs.gov/reports-and-publications/archives/workplan/2017/hhs%20oig%20
work%20plan%202017.pdf [ https://perma.cc/CW6W-SP6W ].
295. James Swann, Litigation, Risk to Reputation May Come from Scrutiny of Doctors’ Payment
Data, BLOOMBERG BNA (Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.bna.com/litigation-risk-reputationn17179895627/ [ https://web.archive.org/web/20160910122004/http://www.bna.com/litigationrisk-reputation-n17179895627/ ].
296. Brian A. Dahl, Mining Open Payments Spend Data, CORP. COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS
(Mar. 15, 2016), http://www.corporatecomplianceinsights.com/mining-open-payments-spend-datamanaging-risk-transparency/ [ https://perma.cc/S8FZ-Q74Y ].
297. Id.
298. Nate Raymond & Jonathan Stempel, U.S. Joins Whistleblower Case Against Insys over
Kickbacks, REUTERS (May 14, 2018, 3:18 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-insys-opioids/us-joins-whistleblower-case-against-insys-over-kickbacks-idUSKCN1IF31M [ https://web.archive.org/
web/20200810001944/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-insys-opioids/u-s-joins-whistleblowercase-against-insys-over-kickbacks-idUSKCN1IF31M ].
299. Pharmaceutical companies have also reduced the amount of certain types of transfers, as
payments for honoraria declined by about fifty percent and by more than thirty percent for gifts in
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A study released by SK&A, a healthcare database, in 2016 suggests that this change
stems in part directly from the disclosures required by the Act. For instance, the
“no-access rate” to physicians and hospitals for reps “jumped from 27.8% in
December 2013 to 36.5% in June 2016.”300 Furthermore, some health systems
actually cited the Act as the reason for its altered stance on admitting reps, such as
ThedaCare in Wisconsin, which barred reps from its clinics in 2013 because
“[p]atients want and deserve complete confidence that their interests are the only
interests when prescribing decisions are made, and by making this change, we can
provide that confidence.”301
Some evidence suggests that the Act may have reduced the number of
prescriptions all together. After observing that there was a reduction in the overall
number of branded drugs being prescribed since the Act, a team of researchers at
the University of Michigan compared three states, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and
New York, post–disclosure law:
Overall, these results consistently suggest that the disclosure law was
effective in reducing the total number of prescriptions and possibly in
driving physicians to substitute away from branded drugs to generics.
These results are among the first to provide empirical evidence that
disclosure laws had an impact on physician prescription behavior, both in
a statistical and economic sense.302
The results of the researchers’ study revealed that by comparing “physicians’
prescriptions with the prescriptions written by physicians in the control group(s),”
there was a “48-59 percent decrease for name-brand statins, a 46-54 percent
decrease for branded antidepressants and a 40-45 percent decrease for branded
antipsychotics.”303 As Professor Manchada, one of the lead researchers, stated,
“[t]here was a much larger relative decrease in name-brand drug prescriptions,

2015. Thomas Sullivan, Open Payments 2015 Data Released, POL’Y & MED., https://
www.policymed.com/2016/07/open-payments-2015-data-released.html [ https://perma.cc/24ETG2MY ] (May 5, 2018).
300. Robert Lowes, More Physicians Saying ‘No Drug Reps Allowed,’ MEDSCAPE (Sept. 13,
2016), http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/868748 [ https://perma.cc/27HR-9N5S ].
301. Id.; see also Diana Swift, Industry Incentives May Drive Pricier Anti-VEGF Drug Use,
MEDSCAPE ( June 23, 2016), https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/865279 [ https://perma.cc/
8BBS-W2ML ] (citing a study where industry incentive payments or reimbursements, of even one to
twenty-five dollars, were linked to a greater likelihood of a physician injecting patients with the payer’s
drugs, even when the cheaper brand was just as effective).
302. Tong Guo, S. Sriram & Puneet Manchanda, “Let the Sun Shine In”: The Impact of Industry
Payment Disclosure on Physician Prescription Behavior 3 (Feb. 25, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https:/
/ssrn.com/abstract=2953399
[ https://web.archive.org/web/20180603204010/https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2953399 ].
303. Id.; Greta Guest, Doctors Write Fewer Prescriptions After Sunshine Laws Reveal Drug
Company Payments, MICH. NEWS ( June 21, 2017), http://ns.umich.edu/new/releases/24922-doctorswrite-fewer-prescriptions-after-sunshine-laws-reveal-drug-company-payments
[ https://perma.cc/
CD4W-46NU ].
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which means some doctors shifted toward generics as a result of the disclosure and
that fits with the intent of the law.”304
Even where fiduciary duties have led courts to conclude that physicians should
disclose financial arrangements, and most have concluded otherwise, the benefit to
the broader healthcare sector has been limited. Indeed, the nature of judicially
enforced fiduciary duties works against the broader system effects accomplished by
the Physician Payments Sunshine Act. As Richard Saver has argued, “[a]s with
provider quality reporting, the real benefits of financial conflicts transparency more
likely accrue over the long term and through secondary audiences
beyond patients.”305
2. Informed Consent
a. Federal and State Sunshine Laws
While the federal law aimed at addressing conflicts of interest in the practice
of medicine, legislators also believed that disclosure was a material part of the
informed consent process. As with the Anti-Kickback Statute, Stark laws, and
equivalent state statutory approaches, transparency laws were based upon ethical
and legal frameworks designed to enhance and protect patient informed consent
principles.306 “The Sunshine Act ensures the openness and transparency of the
financial ties between doctors and the drug and medical device industries. These
financial relationships are valuable and lead to new therapies and technologies, but
the public has a right to know about these financial ties.”307
[T]his legislation does not regulate the business of drug and device
companies. Let the people in industry do their business since they have the
training and the skills to get the job done. But keep the American people
apprised of the business you are doing and how you are doing it. After all,
what is at risk isn’t merely private interest but the health and well-being of
all Americans who depend upon the drugs and medical devices to sustain
and to improve their lives.308
The purpose of the law was to effectively reach the same result as a fiduciary
duty of candor, although far more effectively so. “By requiring drug companies and
medical device manufacturers to report on their gifts to doctors we are empowering
patients to talk with their doctors about the drugs they are prescribed and to learn

304.
305.
306.

Guest, supra note 303.
Saver, supra note 231, at 343.
RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED
CONSENT 3, 114 (1986).
307. Let the Sunshine In: Implementing the Physician Payments Sunshine Act: Roundtable Before
the Special S. Comm. on Aging, supra note 281, at 1 (statement of Sen. Kohl, Chairman, Special
Comm. on Aging).
308. 155 CONG. REC. S788 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 2009) (statement of Sen. Charles Grassley).
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more about the influence of the pharmaceutical industry on the practice
of medicine.”309
b. State Statutory Protections for Informed Consent
As detailed in Section III.B, supra, courts addressing claims by patients for
violations of informed consent turned them into a species of medical malpractice
with accompanying evidentiary complexities including expert testimony.310
Common law disclosure requirements were inconsistent and evolved unpredictably
since inquiries into the doctrine are so factually idiosyncratic.311 Without clear
guidelines to follow, physicians did not know if their disclosure complied with
judicially crafted requirements.
Physicians turned to state legislatures to clarify the law of informed consent.312
In response, state legislatures established procedures for disclosure, adopted
consent forms as evidence of compliance with disclosure requirements, and
authorized administrative processes to specifically list the risks the provider is
expected to disclose.313 In the codification process, state statutes selected the
standard under which informed consent liability was to be analyzed, many adopting
patient-centered standards.314
In 1996, Pennsylvania’s General Assembly codified its state’s common law
doctrine of informed consent.315 The Act expanded its informed consent doctrine,
established a standard that emphasized the patient’s perspective (“receiving
information of the procedure, risks, and alternatives would have been a substantial
factor in the patient’s decision”) and set forth the content of that consent.316 That
informed consent must be obtained by the physician directly, and not through any
agent or assistant.317

309. Press Release, Special Comm. on Aging, U.S. Senate, Grassley, Kohl Say Public Should
Know When Pharmaceutical Makers Give Money to Doctors (Sept. 7, 2007), https://
www.aging.senate.gov/press-releases/grassley-kohl-say-public-should-know-when-pharmaceuticalmakers-give-money-to-doctors [ https://perma.cc/Z4X8-ER8F ].
310. Leonard J. Nelson, III, Michael A. Morrisey & Meredith L. Kilgore, Medical Malpractice
Reform in Three Southern States, 4 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 69, 71 (2008); Sheldon F. Kurtz, The
Law of Informed Consent: From “Doctor Is Right” to “Patient Has Rights,” 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1243,
1245 (2000) (“Today, the right of a patient to participate to some extent in medical decision making
affecting the patient is universally dictated by the ‘informed consent’ laws of all states.”).
311. Sterken et al., supra note 84, at 115.
312. Id. at 117.
313. Anthony Szczygiel, Beyond Informed Consent, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 171, 193 (1994).
314. Id. Jurisdictions were evenly split on whether to apply the reasonable patient or reasonable
physician standard.
315. Daniel A. Durst, Cutting Through Pennsylvania’s Medical Informed Consent Statute: A
Reasonable Interpretation Abolishing the Surgical Requirement, 104 DICK. L. REV. 197, 202 (1999); Act
of Nov. 26, 1996, No. 135, § 10(811-A), 1996 Pa. Laws 776, 789, repealed by Act of Mar. 20, 2002,
No. 13, § 5104(a)(2), 2002 Pa. Laws 154, 197.
316. Durst, supra note 315, at 218 n.164.
317. Shinal v. Toms, 162 A.3d 429, 433 (Pa. 2017).
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Enacted in 1971, the Georgia Medical Consent Law provided a broadly
worded obligation upon physicians to disclose the “treatment or course of
treatment” and, having done so, only claims of fraud could be asserted by
patients.318 When the Georgia Court of Appeals interpreted this statute in 1975, it
ruled that the common law doctrine of informed consent simply did not apply in
the state of Georgia.319 As a result, patients were left with one option: to recover
under the theory that consent was obtained through fraud.320 The court’s strict
interpretation of no informed consent in Georgia led the legislature to adopt the
limited informed consent statute in 1988.321 The statute promoted patient autonomy
through the adoption of the prudent patient standard.322 However, the statute “does
not impose a general requirement of disclosure”323 upon physicians, but rather it
requires disclosure that falls within six statutory categories for a specific list of
surgical procedures.324 The statutory requirements include statute of limitations
requirements, allows cause of action cases to be rooted in both malpractice and
battery for failure to obtain basic consent, and imposes an affidavit requirement.325
Informed consent statutes consistently have detailed disclosure requirements
to ensure patient autonomy and physician responsibility. These statutes are
influenced by the AMA’s lengthy guidelines addressing informed consent.326 For
318. J. Harold Richards, Informed Confusion: The Doctrine of Informed Consent in Georgia, 37
GA. L. REV. 1129, 1141 (2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-6.1(b)(2) (1991).
319. Richards, supra note 318, at 1130; Young v. Yarn, 222 S.E.2d 113, 114 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975),
overruled by Ketchup v. Howard, 543 S.E.2d 371 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).
320. Richards, supra note 318, at 1142–43; see Spikes v. Health, 332 S.E.2d 889, 892
(Ga. Ct. App. 1985).
321. Richards, supra note 318, at 1144; GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-6.1 (2001).
322. § 31-9-6.1(a)(3) (2001).
323. Albany Urology Clinic, P.C. v. Cleveland, 528 S.E.2d 777, 780 (Ga. 2000) (holding that the
physician did not have a duty to disclose cocaine abuse habit since it did not fall within six
statutory categories).
324. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-6.1(a)(1) to (6) includes the six statutory factors
listed below:
(1) A diagnosis of the patient’s condition requiring such proposed surgical or diagnostic
procedure;
(2) The nature and purpose of such proposed surgical or diagnostic procedure;
(3) The material risks generally recognized and accepted by reasonably prudent physicians
of infection, allergic reaction, severe loss of blood, loss or loss of function of any limb or
organ, paralysis or partial paralysis, paraplegia or quadriplegia, disfiguring scar, brain damage,
cardiac arrest, or death involved in such proposed surgical or diagnostic procedure which, if
disclosed to a reasonably prudent person in the patient’s position, could reasonably be
expected to cause such prudent person to decline such proposed surgical or diagnostic
procedure on the basis of the material risk of injury that could result from such proposed
surgical or diagnostic procedure;
(4) The likelihood of success of such proposed surgical or diagnostic procedure;
(5) The practical alternatives to such proposed surgical or diagnostic procedure which are
generally recognized and accepted by reasonably prudent physicians; and
(6) The prognosis of the patient’s condition if such proposed surgical or diagnostic
procedure is rejected.
325. Richards, supra note 318, at 1145; Simpson v. Dickson, 306 S.E.2d 404, 406
(Ga. Ct. App. 1983).
326. AM. MED. ASS’N, Chapter 2: Ethics of Consent, Communication & Decision Making, in
CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 67, at Op. 2.1.1.
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example, Oregon statute section 677.097 states a physician or physician’s assistant
obtains informed consent by explaining: “(1) in general terms the procedure or
treatment to be undertaken; (2) that there may be alternative procedures or methods
of treatment, if any; and (3) that there are risks, if any, to the procedure
or treatment.”327
C. Competence and the Professional Standard of Care
State legislatures have also been active in shaping the course of patients’ claims
based on physicians’ duty of care, but in many respects, it is fundamentally tied to
the nature of the role courts play in law.328 Under a fiduciary theory, the duty of
care would require physicians to be educated and informed about the procedures,
conditions, and surgeries they are administering.329 In reality, the inquiries are less
objective and more subjected to competing expert witness testimony.
Because courts have determined that claims against physicians are broadly
negligence claims, there are constitutional (state and federal) and statutory limits as
to the extent state legislatures and governors may intrude.330 Indeed, many
legislative efforts aimed at shaping negligence claims against physicians have been
struck down by state supreme courts.331 With an estimated seven to seventeen
medical malpractice claims filed per 100 physicians every year, and those claims
characterized as negligence claims, courts feel an understandable obligation to
protect access to courts for those damaged through contractual breach or
tortious injury.332
State legislatures have endeavored to establish standards of care for physicians
and to influence some evidentiary matters like qualification of expert witnesses.
Nevertheless, the level of physician care gives rise to frequent seesaw conflicts
between state legislatures and state courts. In the informed consent context, for
example, in 1975, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin established a framework for
patient claims and physician exculpation in Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine

327. OR. REV. STAT. § 677.097(1)(a)–(c) (2019).
328. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (AM. L. INST. 1965) (stating that a
defendant’s conduct is measured by the reasonable person standard, and comparing their conduct to
that of a reasonable person in similar circumstances).
329. Fred L. Cohen, The Expert Medical Witness in Legal Perspective, 25 J. LEGAL MED. 185,
191 (2004); Moffett & Moore, supra note 143, at 109.
330. Amy Jurevic Sokol & Christopher J. Molzen, The Changing Standard of Care in
Medicine: E-Health, Medical Errors, and Technology Add New Obstacles, 23 J. LEGAL MED. 449,
470 (2002).
331. Watts ex rel. Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633 (Mo. 2012) (striking down
damages caps); John v. Saint Francis Hosp., Inc., 405 P.3d 681 (Okla. 2017) (striking down affidavit
requirement); N. Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Kalitan, 219 So. 3d 49 (Fla. 2017) (striking down damages
cap); Mark A. Behrens & Andrew W. Crouse, The Evolving Civil Justice Reform Movement: Procedural
Reforms Have Gained Steam, but Critics Still Focus on Arguments of the Past, 31 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 173, 180–81 (2006) (surveying major movements in tort reform).
332. Moffett & Moore, supra note 143, at 109.
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Ins. Co.333 In 1982, the Wisconsin legislature codified that framework for
Wisconsin’s informed consent statute.334 Enacted in 1982, Wisconsin Statute
section 448.30 provided that “a physician’s duty to inform ‘is driven by what is
reasonably necessary for a reasonable person to make an intelligent decision with
respect to the choices of treatment or diagnosis.’”335 In addition to supporting
patients through the reasonable standard approach, codification of the listed
exceptions originally stated in Scaria served to protect physicians from certain
liability.336 In Jandre v. Wisconsin Injured Patients & Families Compensation Fund, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court expanded a physician’s duty by requiring physicians to
disclose all diagnostic approaches.337 The Wisconsin legislature responded to Jandre
with 2013 Wisconsin Act 111,338 which did not require the disclosure of information
about alternative medical modes of treatments for any condition the physician has
not included in his or her diagnosis at the time the physician informs the patient.339
It also adopted a physician-centered standard.
After Helling, the case discussed in Part III.C, supra, in which the Washington
Supreme Court rejected custom as decisive of the standard of care, a number of
state legislatures responded and proactively drafted legislation that defined the
standard of care.340 In 1977, North Carolina enacted a statute with the specific
intent of reflecting the common law practices of the state.341 Section 90-21.12
requires expert witnesses for the plaintiff to (1) testify on the standard of care that
the defendant-physician is held to and whether the defendant-physician violated
that standard; and (2) show whether the defendant was the proximate cause of the

333. Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 647, 652–53 (Wis. 1975) (establishing
the legal standard and five exceptions that limited physician liability).
334. WIS. STAT. § 448.30 (2018); Michael Rohde, Information Overload: How the Wisconsin
Supreme Court Expanded the Doctrine of Informed Consent, 46 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1097,
1103–04 (2013).
335. Jandre v. Wis. Injured Patients & Fams. Comp. Fund, 813 N.W.2d 627, 647 (Wis. 2012)
(quoting Martin v. Richards, 531 N.W.2d 70, 78 (Wis. 1995)).
336. Scaria, 227 N.W.2.d at 653; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 448.30 (West 2018) (“[P]hysician’s duty to
inform the patient under this section does not require disclosure of: (2) Detailed technical information
that in all probability a patient would not understand. (3) Risks apparent or known to the patient. (4)
Extremely remote possibilities that might falsely or detrimentally alarm the patient. (5) Information in
emergencies where failure to provide treatment would be more harmful to the patient than treatment.
(6) Information in cases where the patient is incapable of consenting.”).
337. Sterken et al., supra note 84, at 104–05; Jandre, 813 N.W.2d 627.
338. Assemb. B. 111, 101st Leg., 2003 Sess. (Wis. 2013).
339. § 448.30(7).
340. Id.; WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.290 (2019) (stating that a physician is only liable if the
defendant failed to act as a reasonable medical professional in the circumstances).
341. Tyson, supra note 144, at 112–13; see Casey Hyman, Setting the “Bar” in North Carolina
Medical Malpractice Litigation: Working with the Standard of Care that Everyone Loves to Hate, 89
N.C. L. REV. 234 (2010); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12 (2011) (establishing relevant standard of
care for medical malpractice actions).
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plaintiff’s injuries.342 In Connecticut, the state legislature enacted section 52-184c.343
Section 52-184c defines the standard of care and the qualification of expert
witnesses.344 Additionally, section 52-184 strictly requires that a specialist can only
testify for defendants who are specialists.345 Overall, thirty-two states have
provisions regarding minimum qualifications for expert witnesses who testify in
medical malpractice/liability cases.346
State legislatures have also attempted to limit judicial oversight of the standard
of care determination. Twenty-seven states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto
Rico have specific provisions providing for alternative dispute resolution
(arbitration, mediation, or settlement conferences) in medical liability or malpractice
cases. Seventeen jurisdictions—Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, Utah, Virginia, the Virgin Islands, and Wyoming—have requirements that
medical liability or malpractice cases be heard by a screening panel before trial.347
Twenty-eight states have requirements for filing an affidavit or certificate of merit
in order for a medical liability/malpractice claim to move forward.348
D. Statutory Protection of Physician-Patient Confidentiality
Physician-patient confidentiality protects information shared between a
patient and her physician. Physician-patient confidentiality exists to protect those
required to consult with physicians from disclosure of secrets, to prevent physicians
from disclosing humiliating or embarrassing information about a patient, and to
encourage patients to give full disclosure to their physicians.349 “The doctor-patient
relationship requires confidentiality and privacy to work effectively.”350
While the protection of patient information has a long history in medicine
generally, formal legal protection of physician-patient communications is entirely
statutory; it did not exist at common law before legislatures enacted
physician-patient privilege statutes.351 Although some courts have upheld
342. Hyman, supra note 341, at 240. See generally § 90-21.12.
343. CHRISTOPHER REINHART, STANDARD OF CARE IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES
(2003), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2003/olrdata/jud/rpt/2003-R-0486.htm [ https://perma.cc/S9GA75AA ]; Jennifer S.R. Lynn, Connecticut Medical Malpractice, 12 BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 381, 392 (1992);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-184c(a) (1991).
344. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-184c(a).
345. Id. § 52-184c(b) (nonspecialists); id. § 52-184c(c) (specialists).
346. Medical Liability/Medical Malpractice Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, http://
www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/medical-liability-medical-malpractice-laws.aspx
[ https://perma.cc/2GP7-HUDK ] (Aug. 15, 2011).
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. See Perry v. Fiumano, 403 N.Y.S.2d 382 (App. Div. 1978); BURR W. JONES, THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL (6th ed. 2006).
350. Brief Amici Curiae of the New England Journal of Med. et al. in Support of Petitioners at
7, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011) (No. 10-779), 2011 WL 771329.
351. Gerald L. Higgins, The History of Confidentiality in Medicine: The Physician-Patient
Relationship, 35 CANADIAN FAM. PHYSICIAN 921 (1989); see Tucson Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Rowles, 520
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physician-patient confidentiality as a physician’s fiduciary duty, legislatures have
done a better job at protecting patient communications.352 New York was the first
state to enact a physician-patient privilege statute in 1828, and currently, statutes
have been enacted by the majority of U.S. states.353 Protections covered under
physician-patient confidentiality differ state to state, but most statutes have
common features.354 Generally, the privilege belongs to the patient and the patient
has the right to expressly or impliedly waive the privilege.355 Most statutes maintain
exceptions for certain public health reporting requirements, child abuse, injuries
sustained by a lethal weapon, and other specific concerns, although these exceptions
vary state to state.356
Although there is no federal physician-patient evidentiary privilege in judicial
proceedings, physician-patient confidentiality is addressed by the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).357 HIPAA’s Privacy Rule
protects any electronic communication concerning a patient’s protected health
information made by covered healthcare providers.358 Unauthorized disclosure of
confidential patient information is prohibited.359
Federal and state courts of varying jurisdictions have not recognized claims
for breach of confidentiality outside of statutorily defined causes of action. For
example, in Humphers v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, a mother who gave her
daughter up for adoption sued the physician who delivered her daughter for
revealing the mother’s identity to the daughter.360 The mother brought the lawsuit
under a broad theory of breach of information obtained in a confidential or
privileged relationship.361 The court refused to recognize a special cause of action,
anchoring its analysis instead on the Oregon statute providing for discipline or
disqualification of a physician who “wilfully or negligently divulge[ed] a
professional secret.”362
Geisberger v. Willuhn, an Illinois case, reached a similar conclusion, stating that
breach of confidential relationship, breach of contract, and breach of privacy were
P.2d 518 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974); United States v. Meagher, 531 F.2d 752 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 853 (1976).
352. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (West 2017); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-12-21
(2016); see also Horne v. Patton, 287 So. 2d 824 (Ala. 1973).
353. Daniel W. Shuman, The Origins of the Physician-Patient Privilege and Professional Secret, 39
SMU L. REV. 661, 676 (1985), https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol39/iss2/3 [ https://
perma.cc/XQF6-B8QJ ].
354. See Hobbs v. Lopez, 645 N.E.2d 1261 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE
(2013),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/privacysummary.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/
83AY-8WTY ].
358. Id.
359. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (1996).
360. Humphers v. First Interstate Bank of Or., 696 P.2d 527, 527 (Or. 1985).
361. Id.
362. Id. at 535.
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not valid causes of action by a patient for a physician’s unauthorized disclosure of
confidential information.363 The court in Geisberger also narrowly construed the
statute protecting patient confidential information, stating that privileged
communication only exists if the communication was necessary for the performance
of a professional duty on the part of the physician, and communications must relate
to the private, rather than the public, life of the patient.364
Various courts have taken similar positions as the courts in Humphers and
Geisberger.365 Furthermore, while some statutes establish a cause of action for breach
of physician-patient confidentiality, some courts have only recognized
physician-patient privilege as rule of evidence.366 Additionally, even when courts
recognize a cause of action for breach of a physician’s fiduciary duty, they still reach
outcomes adverse to the patient’s interest in confidentiality.367 By strictly construing
statutes and not recognizing causes of action for breach of duty of confidentiality,
courts have not protected patient confidentiality as well as legislatures.
Several states have enacted legislation dealing with HIV/AIDS patients’
confidentiality.368 The legislative intent of HIV/AIDS statutes is twofold: to protect
the general public from an incurable disease and do so without infringing
HIV/AIDS patients’ confidentiality rights.369 Most HIV/AIDS legislation created
new rights for HIV/AIDS patients who wish to remain confidential in legal
proceedings and who wish to receive confidential HIV testing.370 On the other
hand, legislatures sought to protect healthcare providers who give care to
HIV-infected patients from being infected themselves.371 As a result, HIV/AIDS
statutes not only provide confidentiality protection to patients, but they also allow
exceptions for disclosure of confidential information.372 The twofold purpose of
HIV/AIDS statutes was intended by legislatures to strike a balance between patient
confidentiality and public health, and these statutes were intended to protect one
without compromising the other.
Courts, on the other hand, have ruled against protecting HIV/AIDS patients’
confidentiality in favor of public health. Regarding the seemingly simple notion of
whether an HIV/AIDS patient could use a pseudonym during litigation, the court

363. Geisberger v. Willuhn, 390 N.E.2d 945, 946–48 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979).
364. Id. at 947–48.
365. See, e.g., Quarles v. Sutherland, 389 S.W.2d 249 (Tenn. 1965); Ruzzier v. Nw. Lake Forest
Hosp., No. 1-16-1300, 2017 WL 2124349 (Ill. App. Ct. May 10, 2017); May v. N. Health Facilities, Inc.,
No. 2008-P-0054, 2009 WL 806927 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2009).
366. See Quarles, 389 S.W.2d at 251–52; Davis v. Earls, No. W2000-00280-COA-R3-CV, 2001
WL 589138 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 30, 2001).
367. See Quarles, 389 S.W.2d at 251–52.
368. FLA. STAT. § 381.004 (2018) (outlining informed consent procedures and confidentiality
for HIV/AIDS patients); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.242 (West 2018); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305
/ 9 (2018).
369. See Waddell v. Bhat, 571 S.E.2d 565, 566 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
370. See 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305 / 2, 305/9.
371. Waddell, 571 S.E.2d at 566.
372. See GA. CODE ANN. § 24-12-21 (West 2016).
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in Doe v. Hall ruled that use of a pseudonym is not protected by statute and the
decision is at the trial court’s discretion.373
In Smith v. Datla, the court ruled that the statute of limitations regarding
HIV/AIDS patient confidentiality had run out, and the patient had no other
remedy at common law or otherwise.374 The Smith case shows how unwilling courts
are to construe statutes liberally or provide common law protections for
patient confidentiality.
At the federal level, not only do federal courts not recognize an evidentiary
privilege arising from the fiduciary nature of the doctor-patient relationship,
U.S. Supreme Court rulings have limited the reach of federal statutes that might
support such a privilege. While HIPAA acknowledged that patient medical
information is sensitive and must be kept private, federal courts have not allowed it
to serve as the basis of an evidentiary privilege.375 In IMS v. Sorrell, the case striking
down Vermont’s law protecting physician prescribing information, the ruling
acknowledged the risk of exposing a patient’s prescription history because of
increasingly sophisticated ways of identifying patients from otherwise deidentified
sources, especially with access to physicians’ names and locations.376 Protections for
genetic privacy, similarly, have been far more expansive in state and federal
legislatures than in courts.377
E. Good Faith
As suggested in Parts I.A and II.E, the fiduciary duty of good faith generally
and the physician’s duty specifically lack coherent or consistent meaning as courts
have fashioned that duty.378 Courts have stated generally that because the
relationship is based on trust and confidence, the utmost good faith must
be exercised.379

373. Doe v. Hall, 579 S.E.2d 838, 840 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
374. Smith v. Datla, 164 A.3d 1110, 1124 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017).
375. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 n.28 (1977) (“The physician-patient evidentiary privilege
is unknown to the common law.”); United States v. Witt, 542 F. Supp. 696, 698–99 (S.D.N.Y.) (holding
that there is no generally recognized physician-patient privilege), aff’d, 697 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1982);
United States v. Burzynski Cancer Rsch. Inst., 819 F.2d 1301, 1311 (5th Cir. 1987) (“In the context of
federal criminal proceedings, no physician-patient privilege exists.”); Nw. Mem’l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362
F.3d 923, 926 (7th Cir. 2004) (“We do not think HIPAA is rightly understood as an Act of Congress
that creates a privilege.”).
376. Brief Amici Curiae of the New England Journal of Med. et al. in Support of Petitioners,
supra note 350, at 8.
377. See generally Anya E.R. Prince, Comprehensive Protection of Genetic Information: One Size
Privacy or Property Models May Not Fit All, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 175 (2013).
378. AM. MED. ASS’N, supra note 67 (stating that physicians have an obligation to “place
patient’s welfare above the physician’s own self-interest”).
379. Cates v. Wilson, 350 S.E.2d 898, 905 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986), modified, 361 S.E.2d 734
(N.C. 1987); see also Thomas L. Hafemeister & Richard M. Gulbrandsen, Jr., The Fiduciary Obligation of
Physicians to “Just Say No” if an “Informed” Patient Demands Services that Are Not Medically Indicated,
39 SETON HALL L. REV. 335, 370 (2009).
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Under common law, a physician must exercise the utmost good faith.380 This
doctrine’s requirements are self explanatory when it is easily recognizable that the
physician is acting in bad faith.381 The generality of the good faith obligation
provides a great framework for a physician’s career; however, the lack of
enumerated steps to ensure physicians’ actions are made in good faith creates
confusion. This lack of guidance and clarity makes physicians more susceptible to
disciplinary or malpractice action.
As a statutory matter, good faith has been used broadly to preserve the
integrity of the physician-patient relationship against specific pressures like the
provision of emergency treatment, the prescription of pain medications, and the
special duties that accompany the protection of children.382
A majority of state statutes have either explicitly defined “good faith” and/or
have listed specific requirements for physician practices. For example, when
prescribing a controlled substance which is a narcotic, the Illinois Controlled
Substance Act clearly defines good faith to mean
the prescribing or dispensing of a controlled substance by a practitioner in
the regular course of professional treatment to or for any person who is
under his or her treatment for a pathology or condition other than that
individual’s physical or psychological dependence upon or addiction to a
controlled substance . . . .383
In addition, the Act specifically requires a physician in good faith to meet
requirements for multiple prescriptions and to keep a record of all controlled
substances received, administered, dispensed, or professionally used otherwise than
by prescription.384 A physician also acts in good faith when prescribing or
distributing a controlled substance or any other drug in the course of professional
practice to relieve pain and suffering or diseases for a duration that is medically
necessary.385 Delaware has similarly provided for the specific administration of
naloxone, a drug used to treat opioid overdoses that may have significant side
effects, requiring physicians to use it in good faith.386
Equally important, state statutes actively limit a physician’s fear of future
liability by providing a greater incentive to engage in emergency practices that could
380. See, e.g., Black v. Littlejohn, 325 S.E.2d 469, 482 (N.C. 1985); Tracy v. Merrell Dow Pharm.,
Inc., 569 N.E.2d 875, 879 (Ohio 1991); Hummel v. State, 196 S.W.2d 594, 595 (Ark. 1946) (quoting
ALFRED W. HERZOG, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE § 96 (1931)).
381. See generally Hoopes v. Hammargren, 725 P.2d 238, 242 (1986) (finding that
physician’s sexual relations with patient could violate duty of utmost good faith); N.Y. EDUC. LAW
§ 6509 (McKinney 2008) (defining professional misconduct).
382. See Gail B. Agrawal, Resuscitating Professionalism: Self-Regulation in the Medical
Marketplace, 66 MO. L. REV. 341, 384–85 (2001).
383. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 570 / 102(u) (1971).
384. Id. at 570 / 312(a), (a-5), (c), (d); see also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8331 (1978) (defining good
faith in rendering emergency when a reason).
385. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-214(b)(12) (2016); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2242
(West 2007).
386. See generally DEL. CODE tit. 16, § 3001G (2020).
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potentially save lives.387 At common law, any emergency aid provided by a physician
resulted in the creation of a physician-patient relationship where there was duty of
reasonable care owed.388 “To encourage physicians to stop at the scene of an
emergency, usually a roadside accident, and to render assistance to injured parties
without fear of malpractice litigation,” states granted varying degrees of immunity
from civil liability for physicians.389 Generally, these laws require (1) an emergency;
(2) the absence of a legal duty to act; and (3) care provided in good faith.390
Similarly, states offer the immunity for physicians who in good faith report or
assist in investigations of an alleged child abuse or neglect.391 Pennsylvania law, like
many states, provides a presumption of good faith for physicians reporting or
participating in investigations related to child abuse.392
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that the extension of fiduciary duties to more actors
in society, while appealing to the hope for more people acting in the interest of
others, may in fact not work in practice. Because fiduciaries are attributed to possess
knowledge, skill, deliberation, discretion, and, generally, power and virtue, it is
understandable to wish for more people to look and act as fiduciaries are theorized
to do. Indeed, physicians play a central role in fiduciary narratives because they are
fairly described by all of the panegyric attributes extended to attorneys, trustees,
guardians, and other regulated professionals.
Yet the attributes and the reality of the fiduciary relationship are different,
critically so when it comes to holding fiduciaries to account for the virtues they are
supposed to possess. The practice of medicine, like the practice of law, accounting,
the stewardship of resources for others, and the protection of minors or
incapacitated persons, occurs against a complex backdrop that implicates not only
the entrustor’s relationship with the fiduciary but the fiduciary’s relationship with
society more broadly. In the physician-patient context, this has led professional
bodies, legislators, and regulators to draft complex, certainly imperfect systems to
address pressures on fiduciaries’ loyalty, candor, competence, discretion, and even
good faith. As this Article demonstrates, those systems accomplish more for greater

387. Stewart R. Reuter, Physicians as Good Samaritans: Should They Receive Immunity for Their
Negligence When Responding to Hospital Emergencies?, 20 J. LEGAL MED. 157 (1999).
388. Colby v. Schawartz, 144 Cal. Rptr. 624, 627 (Ct. App. 1978).
389. Reuter, supra note 387; Pemberton v. Dharmani, 469 N.W.2d 74, 76 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991)
(quoting H.B. 4326, 78th Leg., 1975–1976 Sess. (Mich. 1975)) (“[T]he bill would encourage health care
personnel to render emergency care in hospitals and other health care facilities.”).
390. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1501 (2016) (defining the scope of immunity eligibility); 23
PA. CONS. STAT. § 6318 (2014).
391. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.106 (West 1995); id. at § 261.104 (mandating that the
content of a report include: “(1) the name and address of the child; (2) the name and address of the
person responsible for the care, custody, or welfare of the child; and (3) any other pertinent information
concerning the alleged or suspected abuse or neglect.”).
392. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6318 (2014).
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numbers of patients, physicians, and those with whom they work and live than
judicially enforced duties are likely to achieve.

